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ABSTRACT
The modem liberal university is based upon a philosophical framework first 
conceptualized by John Dewey in his seminal book Democracy and Education. 
Although Dewey’s philosophy was instrumental in reforming the university, it 
possesses an inherent contradiction that has proved problematic for the manner in 
which the modem North American university functions. While Dewey’s theories 
were aimed at democratizing the university and allowing for the pursuit of critical 
freedom, his main goal was to bring the university in line with the economic realities 
of industrial capitalism. Herein lies the contradiction: the student is free to study 
whatever she may wish, but this freedom must ultimately accede to economic 
integration.
The aim of this thesis is to articulate and examine the above contradiction and 
to investigate how the liberal university functions as a capitalist institution—an 
institution that is, above all, aimed at supporting the dominant economic framework. 
Thus I will critically examine the philosophy of education and the liberal university 
using Marxian philosophy. I will investigate how this institution captures, codes, and 
disciplines its students. Finally I will attempt to conceptualize an alternative 
philosophy of education using the ground-breaking theories in Paulo Freire’s 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
iii
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Prologue
“Education is suffering from narration sickness.” 
-Paulo Freire, “Pedagogy o f  the Oppressed”-
The university is an institutional shadow cast by the capitalist North American 
state. Since a shadow reflects the shape and form of the object that casts it, the university 
reflects the shape of modem capitalism found in North American society. As the state’s 
shadow it is also part of what Deleuze and Guattari call the social machine (“socius”) and 
so serves the purpose of conditioning and coding its student to become part of the state 
system.
This thesis will empirically substantiate the preceding claim. The comparison of 
society to a machine is based upon Deleuze and Guattari’s contention that any social 
arrangement, any state, requires an assemblage of parts (institutions, people, 
architectures) in order to function properly. Thus, just as a machine’s sole function is 
efficiency, and such effiency is only possible if all the assembled parts work together 
properly, so a society is judged socially efficient due to the interrelation of its own parts. 
This machinic description of society will be expanded and explained in more detail 
throughout the text.
Furthermore, I have chosen to analyze and describe the capitalist reality of North 
American society by way of Karl Marx and Marxist influenced theorists. The reason I 
have chosen this theoretical framework is “because of capitalism—unfinished business of 
a serious magnitude... The major source of practical, brutally effective reductionism and 
totalization at work on the planet today is not Marxism, but the world market, now 
enabled by computer networks, satellite broadcasts, just-in-time production, and high- 
tech weaponry.”1 Few would dispute that we live in a capitalist society, and I have 
chosen to use a Marxist critique of capitalism because Marxist theory is the only
1 Dyer-Witheford, p. 9.
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philosophical body of literature that has provided a consistent, logical, critical, and 
thorough analysis of capitalism. Although this description and analysis of capitalism will 
be revealed in the following pages, in relation to the university, I will define capitalism 
here as a social system
based on the imposition of universal commodification, 
including, centrally, the buying and selling of human life­
time. Its tendency is to subordinate all activity to the law of 
value—the socially imposed law of exchange. It relates a 
monological master-narrative in which only money talks.
Such a system operates by process of massive reduction—
Marx called it “abstraction”—that perceives and processes 
the world solely as an array of economic factors. Under 
this classificatory grid—this “classing” of the w o r ld -  
human subjects figure only as so much labour power and 
consumption capacity, and their natural surroundings as so
'y
much raw material.
Since the university is an institution which is central to the reproduction of the capitalist 
system, it too must be subject to critique when the legitimacy of that system is in 
question. Moreover, because the pedagogical approach that I am proposing at the end of 
this paper is developed from the successful educational philosophy of Paulo Freire, a 
Marxist thinker, then it would seem only logical to use a Marxist approach to provide a 
background to Freire’s pedagogy.
Due to the fact that I will be describing a situation where the student is, according 
to Daniel Cohn-Bendit, allowed “a measure of liberty, but only so long as [she does not] 
challenge the basis of university education: the preparation [to] return to the ranks of 
[capitalist society] from which [she has] taken temporary leave of absence,”3 I would be 
naive to assume that I am exempt from this pedagogical problem. Moreover, many of the 
theoretical sources that will be used in this project are also products of the institution that
2 Ibid., p. 9.
3 Cohn-Bendit, p. 27
2
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is being critiqued. A paper with such an identity is bound to be plagued by the very 
symptoms I hope to describe. Such a paper is bound to the rules of academia. The 
contradiction this paper seems to fall victim to is in fact a product of the contradictory 
nature of the current university system. The liberal model of education from which the 
modem university has evolved contained a contradiction when it was first framed. In this 
introduction I will briefly summarize this contradiction, beginning with an exposition of 
Dewey’s educational philosophy. This summary will provide necessary background for 
the thesis I will advance. That thesis is that the universities possess the potential to 
radically change society, but the liberal model of education is a barrier to this potential.
Dewey’s model of liberal education
American philosopher John Dewey’s model of education has been influential “in a 
number of ways in the democratic administration of schools and universities.”4 Although 
there are a number of sources which may be examined in order to understand the liberal 
educational system, Dewey’s philosophical approach, in Democracy & Education will be 
summarized in order to provide a basic introduction to the manner in which the current 
institution functions. Indeed, Dewey’s educational theories are probably the best 
introduction to the liberal system because they have had enormous influence on the way 
the modem university functions.
Dewey begins Democracy & Education with the stated desire to connect education 
with the experimental method of the sciences and with modem society as a whole:
As societies become more complex in structure and 
resources, the need of formal or intentional teaching and 
learning increases. As formal teaching and training grow in 
extent, there is a danger of creating an undesirable split
4 Dewey, Jane M., p. 39.
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between the experience gained in more direct associations 
and what is acquired at school.5
The liberal model’s justification, then, was to reform education so that it would fall in 
line with modem society. Dewey believed that academia was not providing students with 
the proper ways of associating with the technological world because “the rapid growth in 
the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill”6 had outstripped the 
organization of education.
It should be noted at this point that the liberal concept of education, as evidenced 
in Dewey, originally possessed a positive agenda. Dewey felt that the student was being 
“trained like an animal rather than educated like a human being.”7 Education, then, was 
conceived of as “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process.”8 The idea was to 
produce a strong individual through this process of cultivation. Thus, Dewey recognizes 
the problem of how the educational process became concerned with the formation of “the 
citizen” and not the “man”.9 Taking his cue from Kant, Dewey “defines education as the 
process by which man becomes man.”10 Contrasted with “the citizen”, “the man” is the 
socially stable and free individual, and humanity, for Dewey, is the composition of these 
free individuals. Therefore, the liberal ideal so far as it is concerned with “the promotion 
of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity,”11 is progressive.
5 Dewey, p. 9.
6 ibid.
7 ibid., p. 13.
8 ibid., p. 10
9 ibid., p. 93.
10 ibid., p. 95.
11 ibid.
4
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However Dewey is not only concerned with the cultivation of humanity. He is 
equally concerned with modem society, the general aim of liberal education is “social 
efficiency... [and] the importance of industrial competency”12 since individuals need to 
survive and function within the overarching societal structure. The prime function of 
education, therefore, is to produce in the student the “result ability to make one’s way 
economically in the world and to manage economic resources usefully”.13 Education, 
then, has an “instrumental value” as a means to an end14 —the end being the integration of 
the student with society. This end is necessary because education must mirror the 
“accompanying... advance of science, the industrial revolution, and the development of 
democracy.”15 This movement towards societal integration is in contradiction with 
Dewey’s goal of cultivating human capacities, and we will examine both poles of the 
contradiction.
First I would like to stress that Dewey’s conception of educational reforms is bom 
from an ideal to cultivate humanity. The philosophy discussed in Democracy &
Education is one which (hue to its claims) conceives of the educational process as 
democratic. Dewey believes that all of the disciplines have their proper place because 
“[a]ll of them together make up the whole of life by just opposition and addition.”16 The 
liberal model of education, however, is intrinsically flawed due to its prime aim at social 
efficiency, which I will demonstrate below.
Thus, his commitment to diversity not withstanding, Dewey asserts that the values 
of all disciplines are valid, his model is one of integration: one must be fostered to take
12 ibid., p. 119.
1 3  i b i d .
14 ibid., p. 243.
15 ibid., p. 331.
16 ibid., p. 247.
5
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one’s place in modem, capitalist society. Here his model is contradictory. The 
“humanity” of the student, then, is the result of this integration; even though Dewey 
claims he is interested in the “individual” and not the “citizen” he is interested in a 
particular kind of individual: the capitalist individual whose education is an instrumental 
means to this end. Thus, as noted above, “the liberal university allows its students a 
measure of liberty, but only so long as they do not challenge the basis of university 
education: the preparation... for a return to the ranks of [capitalist society] from which 
they have taken a temporary leave of absence.”17
Furthermore, the philosophy of education is concerned with giving “individuals a 
personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure 
social changes without introducing disorder.”18 In this sense, Dewey’s model of 
education is progressive on analogy with the way in which capitalism is progressive vis-a- 
vis feudalism—individuals are still socially integrated, but technological and social 
advances change the method of integration19—and the progression ends there. Control is 
placed alongside social relationships, and one is taught to bring about social change 
without disrupting the overall system—to be taught to work within the system.
Finally, Dewey’s model of education is one that mirrors the capitalist socius 
(although Dewey always refers to this society as “democratic society”). As 
aforementioned, the educational institution is supposed to represent the societal structure, 
accompanying its advances, and emphasizing the goal of economic integration and 
competency. Thus, his conception of education becomes—however unintentioned—a 
“banking concept” (where students are the banks in which their teachers make deposits).
17 Cohn-Bendit, p. 27.
18 Dewey, p. 99, emphasis added.
19 This will be examined in later chapters in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the 
“Apparatus of Capture” and the movement from “social subjection” to “machinic enslavement”.
6
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It regards humans “as adaptable, manageable beings”20 who are raised up (“nurtured”, 
“cultivated”, “fostered”) by an educational authority. This patronizing attitude of 
education is evident at the beginning of Democracy & Education where Dewey writes, 
“[w]e also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up—words which express the difference of 
level which education aims to cover.”21
Here I have contented myself with a general overview which should serve to 
orient the reader with the position this paper will adopt. I will develop specific criticisms 
at appropriate points in later sections.
The contradictory nature of the university. An ideal pedagogy
If Dewey’s pedagogy is central to the modem university, the basis of this 
institution is contradictory. Dewey’s philosophy makes evident that there is a strong 
inclination to produce free thinking individuals (educating students as human beings 
instead of animals) but this inclination is overridden by the very fact that such an 
education is driven by the goal of socialization and integration. Moreover, this social 
production is justified by the belief that the educational process is grounded on this 
principle of freedom. The overall contradiction can be summed up in Daniel Cohn- 
Bendit’s aforementioned claim that the university institution offers the student (or the 
professor) “a measure of liberty” within its shadow, but only as a leave of absence from 
modem, capitalist society. It is not that this measure of liberty is bad in itself, since 
without this critical freedom a number of the resources used in this paper would not exist 
(Deleuze, for example, and Foucault taught and wrote within the academic world).
The point, then, is to expand this measure of liberty found in the university so that 
the student can engage freely in her own education—a freedom which extends beyond
20 Freire, p. 54.
21 Dewey, p. 10.
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academia and into the social world. Just as Marx grounded Hegel’s abstract freedom in 
the social realm, the critical freedom inside academia must be expanded so that it leaves 
with the students and reaches out beyond the institutional shadow.
It is the aim of this paper, then, to criticize the prevailing institutions from the 
perspective of an ideal pedagogy where the efforts of the educators coincide with the 
educated “to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization.”22 The 
task, therefore, is to conceive of the student on analogy with Marx’s alienated worker.
The university only exists because there are students who believe that the system will 
grant them a “measure of freedom”.
However, the apparent freedom and ‘“humanism’ of the banking approach 
[evident in the liberal educational model] masks the effort to turn women and men into 
automatons—the very negation of their ontological vocation to be fully human.”23 Thus, 
this paper will first examine the structure of this society’s liberal university in more detail 
as a socializing force and a system that uses the “banking approach”. It will conclude 
with a sketch of a liberating university. This paper’s project will begin by discussing 
the university in relation to capitalism, which will provide the general theoretical 
framework for understanding the university’s identity as a socializing institution. The 
second section will examine the methods of regimentation the university utilizes, and the 
third section will conclude the investigation of the university as a socializing force by 
reexamining the liberal educational model of knowledge in more detail. The final 
section will examine the ideal model of pedagogy, proposed in the philosophy of Paulo 
Freire.
22 Freire, p. 56.
23 ibid, p. 55.
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CHAPTER ONE:
the liberal university and its general relation to capitalism
“Once upon a time the universities had a certain 
prestige; the student persists in the belief that he is 
lucky to be there. But he came too late. His 
mechanical, specialized education is as profoundly 
degraded... as his own intellectual level, because the 
modem economic system demands a mass production 
o f [critically] uneducated students who have been 
rendered incapable o f  thinking.”
Situationist International, “On the Poverty o f  
Student Life ”
Introduction
“In a word,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “the socius as a full body forms a surface 
where all production is recorded, whereupon the entire process appears to emanate from 
this recording surface. Society constructs its own delirium by recording the process of 
production”.1 In other words, the capitalist socius exists as a totality that distributes 
institutions and people with a consciousness of a false reality—a consciousness that 
capitalism is reality and everything appears to emanate from this concept. The university 
system, according to Deleuze and Guattari’s idea, exists as a direct result of capitalism’s 
delirium: it is proposed, by liberal idealists, that their concept of a reformed and ‘free’ 
university can only exist within the current socius; otherwise, as Dewey wrote, referring 
to the pre-liberal university system, the student will be “trained like an animal”. 
Capitalism constructs a delirium (a true consciousness of false reality)—it constructs 
reality in its own image—and therefore the university and its students should only be 
understood in the context of the social whole as captured products within a larger system 
of delirium.
1 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 10.
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Reality, however, has been coded by the axioms of “the social machine which 
takes the place of the old codings and organizes all of the... flows of scientific and 
technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in service of its ends.”2 Thus, 
capitalism as a social machine has reorganized the structure of the pre-capitalist 
university in order to make this institution beneficial to capitalism. As will be evidenced 
and discussed below, the university is instrumental in promoting these flows of capitalist 
coding3 —allowing the student to be coded, controlled and socialized. This chapter of the 
thesis will examine the university as a disseminator of capitalist code, and thus how this 
institution is primarily capitalist—how it emanates from the surface of the socius—in 
theory and practice. The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to focus on the general shape 
the capitalist shadow of the university takes.
The following section will examine the nature of the student as a commodity, by 
comparing her to Marx’s alienated worker. Next, the general form of the liberal 
university-in which the commodified student exists—will be described in terms of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “apparatus of capture” . The following sections, on 
Lukacs’ concept of “reification” and Debord’s theory of the “spectacle”, will investigate 
the nature of the capitalistic relation between the commodified student and the university. 
The focus of this chapter is to examine the liberal university as a capitalist machine for 
the production of worker-citizens. The theoretical positions taken in the chapter will be 
justified empirically in the concluding section.
(Before proceeding any further, I should note that since this chapter’s goal is to 
describe the university’s relation to capitalism its analysis is mostly from the point of
2 ibid., p. 233.
3 I realize, of course, that Deleuze and Guattari claim that capitalism possesses axiomatic flows 
which decode the socius but present the illusion of coding. This is a distinction, however, which 
was used to compare the cultural “codes” of social subjection (evident in pre-capitalist societies), 
and the economic “axioms” of machinic enslavement (evident in capitalism)-a distinction which, if 
pursued, would take this paper off its path.
10
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view of capitalism or, more accurately, it is a top-down approach that mainly examines 
the system’s super-structure. The truth, however, is that we shape the system as much as 
it shapes us. This fact, though, will be explored in detail in the final chapter.)
The student as alienated
Although the alienated worker of Marx’s time lived in a much worse situation 
than the university student in North America (who is, mostly but not exclusively, a 
member of the privileged class), there is a definite relation between the two. This section 
will examine how the student, to some degree, “sinks to the level of a commodity”4 by 
investigating how the student class is alienated from the professor class, how the student 
becomes alienated from her work, how the student becomes alienated from her nature, 
and how the student becomes alienated from other students.
Analogously to Marx’s theory of classes, the educational structure of the liberal 
university appears to be divided into two groups: professors and students~“the property 
owners and the propertyless workers”5, the property being intellectual and educational 
property. The truth, however, is that the university administration is the dominant class, 
and that the professors are merely a representation of the university administration; 
professors are also subject to alienation because they are also workers. Rather than 
having complete autonomy, university professors are like the managers of the factory 
system-workers as well, but in positions of authority. While the administration is the 
primary agent of transmission for the capitalist code, university teachers are exploited as 
mouthpieces of this transmission and the students are alienated from their teachers due to
4 Marx, p. 106.
5 ibid.
1 1
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an authoritarian structure.6 The professor class, representing the administration, controls 
areas like the “flows of scientific and technical code”, and the student must work for the 
privilege of being coded. Therefore, sometimes “the teacher confuses the authority of 
knowledge with his or her own professional authority, which she and he sets in 
opposition to the freedom of the students.”7
Within this divided structure the student produces work which she “confronts... 
as something alien, as a power independent of [herself].”8 Papers, assignments, exams all 
become products to which the student is in bondage. The student’s job is to meet 
deadlines and produce work that has the nature of “an alien object.”9 Thus, the student 
puts her life into [her school work]; but now [her] life no longer belongs to [her] but to 
the [school work].”10 In this manner, the product of the student’s labour stands over her 
as the force by which she is known and judged by the university institution. Moreover, 
when the student investigates her marks, applies for continuing education, grants, or a 
job, the product of her labour “becomes a power on its own confronting [her].”11
The fact that the student has become a slave to her school work “enables [her] to 
exist, first, as a [student]-, and, second as a physical subject. ”12 Reduced, in the eyes of 
the university institution to the identity of student—and, as such, to an “SEU” (student 
enrollment unit)—the individual within this system becomes alienated from both herself 
and her own products. The work space maxim you are your job  is replicated in the
6 This point will be discussed further in Chapters Three and Four.
7 Freire, p. 54.




12 ibid., p. 109.
12
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university: you are your grades. Therefore, a student’s worth is derived from her nature 
as a function of the institutional ranking grid, and not as a student understood as a freely 
engaged intellectual being.
In the capitalist socius at large, “the direct relationship between the worker (labor) 
and production”13 is concealed. The worker generates capital through the commodities 
she produces for a business and its owners. Yet the owners of this business exert the 
power to control the worker in the form of wages, hiring, and firing. Similarly, the 
student generates capital, both in the form of tuition and intellectual capital through her 
work, for the educational institution and its professors. However this institution exerts 
the force to control the student in the form of marking and teaching. Furthermore, the 
teacher always educates, and it is the student’s job to be educated. As Freire argues:
The teacher presents himself to his students as their 
necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, 
he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like 
the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as 
justifying the teacher’s existence—but... they never discover 
that they educate the teacher.14
Although there is latitude for a reciprocal relationship between professor and student, the 
liberal educational model restricts its scope. The student’s intellectual labour, then, is 
further estranged from her being; she regards it as the product of the teacher’s 
authoritative pedagogy—a regurgitation of lectures and approved texts—rather than her 
own product that has been produced through a process of mutual pedagogy. The grading 
format provides a powerful sign, in the form of a mark, which strengthens the 
authoritarian structure: the student, who is her paper, is marked and graded by her 
teacher. Her final worth is assessed and then reduced to a letter or a percentage. The
13 ibid., p. 110.
14 Freire, p. 53.
13
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student is thus a commodity, that is, a product of the entire institution—coded by 
information that is controlled by the administrative class.
Therefore, the student’s alienated labour “makes his life activity, his essential 
being, a mere means to his existence.”15 Like Marx’s alienated worker, the student is 
both alienated in the process of her labour and in its product. Just as the activity of 
education is alienated so too is the commodified product. The human being’s intrinsic 
ability to learn and critically engage with the world becomes, within the liberal university, 
a means to an economic existence in the capitalist socius at large: a “result ability to make 
one’s way economically in the world”.16 The process of education, emanating, according 
to Deleuze and Guattari, from the capitalist coding, will reduce the student’s freedom and 
education to an economic means of existence.
Furthermore, and still in line with the analogy with Marx, the liberal university 
alienates students from each other:
[w]hat applies to a man’s relation to his work, to the 
product of his labor... also holds of a man’s relation to the 
other man... each man views the other in accordance with 
the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself 
as a [student].17
As workers are placed against one another in the workplace in order to compete for better 
paying jobs and their bosses’ attention, so the students can compete for higher marks (for 
not everyone is allowed to receive an “A”), grants, and graduate school. In some areas of 
university, like Law School or Medical School, competition is so extreme that texts will 
be defaced or stolen in order to prevent others’ from having equal access to information. 
Neither does this capitalist form of competition end with the student; it accompanies her
15 Marx, p. 113.
16 Dewey, p. 119.
17 Marx, p. 114-115.
14
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as she enters the economic world or, if she chooses to stay within the university 
institution and become professor, she must compete with others for academic honour.
Ultimately, the professor is part of the above process as well. Although this 
section has examined how the professor has been set against the student, the conflict 
between teacher and student is, as aforementioned, a tool of a capitalistic administration. 
By allowing the professor to foster student alienation, the administration creates what 
Freire calls the teacher-student contradiction and perpetuates heirarchical control over 
intellectual labour. By setting these two groups in opposition to one another, the 
administration attempts to obscure the possiblity of “connections between both students 
and instructors... [who may notice that] their conditions [are] far closer to that of the rest 
of the labor force.”18
Finally, the students’ education becomes “an alien power... because it belongs to 
some other man than the [student] More specifically, the students’ labour belongs to 
the university: the net grade point average—along with the amount of SEUs—provide the 
institution with a respectable status, resulting in profit in the form of more SEUs. I will 
now develop this point through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the apparatus of 
capture.
The university as apparatus of capture
The institution of the modem university is intrinsically capitalist because 
“[k]nowledge, information, and specialized education are just as much parts of capital... 
as is the most elementary labor of the worker.”20 This section will investigate the fact 
that education has been appropriated by the capitalist machine. As was discussed at the
18 Dyer-Witheford, p. 112.
19 Marx, p. 115.
20 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
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beginning of this chapter, all methods of social production are recorded upon the surface 
of a socius so that they appear to emanate from its identity and form part of the social 
reality. Just as there have been imperial and feudal recordings, so too now there is a 
capitalist recording. “State societies,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “are defined by 
apparatuses of capture [that is, institutional structures which situate and locate individuals 
within the laws of the social machine]; urban societies by instruments of polarization; 
nomadic societies by war machines; and finally [despotic and/or capitalist] organizations 
are defined by the encompassment of heterogeneous social formations.”21 The State is 
the dominant apparatus of capture, but it possesses within it similar such apparatuses of 
capture which perform a similar function at smaller levels. The state, then, is the 
megamachine22 and its constituent parts are micromachines of varying degrees—from 
institutions like the university, down to individuals like the student. This section will 
discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of apparatus o f capture and how the commodity 
nature of the worker, discussed by Marx, is illuminated by the notion of machinic 
enslavement. It will conclude with investigating this concept in light of the university and 
the alienated student.
Before going any further, however, it is important to understand what Deleuze and 
Guattari mean by “machine”—a concept for them that has much more depth than the 
factory machines that Marx analyzed during early industrialism. Although this term 
refers as well to factory machines, war machines, and other technological machines which 
propagate capital, “any assemblage of [human] desire—at a subjective or social level—is 
[according to Deleuze and Guattari] a ‘machine’. The term is aimed to break with 
humanist concepts of natural identities, to emphasize... the constructed, produced, and
21 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 435.
22 ibid.
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collectively fabricated nature of psyche and society.”23 Thus, while individuals may be 
machinically enslaved, they possess the potential to liberate themselves by constructing 
new arrangements of what they desire. In this way it is possible for them to liberate what 
they truly want from what the market makes it possible to want. By investigating the 
concept of desire and its arrangements, Deleuze and Guattari, while accepting the critical 
histories of various Marxisms, go beyond the traditional conceptual boundaries of this 
philosophy. They maintain that desire is important, and how we arrange this desire has 
implications on the social level. The implications of such a concept of desire will be 
discussed in greater detail in the final chapter of this thesis.
With the basic concept of “machine” now defined, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept 
of an apparatus o f capture means, basically, that a State formation needs-in order to be a 
formation-to capture and produce citizens to desire that which it provides. Thus, 
individuals are caught in a delirium, the false construction of reality that claims that 
capitalism is eternal. As they explain:
This is the social machine’s supreme task, inasmuch as the 
apportioning of production corresponds to extractions from 
a chain, resulting in a residual share for each member, in a 
global system of desire and destiny that organizes the 
productions of production, the productions of recording, and 
the productions of consumption.24
In order to exist as a State, then, the socius must capture, code, and organize its members 
in a specific formation.
In this manner, the “State as apparatus of capture has a power o f appropriation’̂  
due to the fact that nothing is exempt from becoming part of the overall process of the
23 Dyer-Witheford, p. 181.
24 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142.
25 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 437.
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self-expansion of the megamachine. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari could 
assert that knowledge and education are parts of capital. Inspired by Marx’s Capital, 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the dominant apparatus of capture in capitalism (of which 
smaller apparatuses are constituent parts) is defined by three factors: land (which includes 
rent and the landowner), work (which includes profit and the entrepreneur), and money 
(which includes taxation and the banker).26 It is these three factors which make “possible 
the capitalist mode of production itself’27, as Marx had noted in Capital, since these three 
components are the basis of the world market. For it is these factors which “form the first 
seeds of private property... develop trade, and... invent a kind of private slavery.”28 That 
is, capitalism is a form of slavery “no longer determined as [traditional] slavery or 
serfdom but [which has become] naked and free labor”.29
The concepts of naked, free labour and, eventually, independent capital make 
reality appear as if the State has ceased to exist as an independent power arrayed against 
individuals. The market rules all and has “deterritorialized” specific political 
organizations:
That is why capitalism marks a mutation in worldwide or 
ecumenical organizations, which now take on a consistency 
of their own: the worldwide axiomatic... determines [social 
formations’] relations, while organizing an international 
division of labor. From all of these standpoints, it could be 
said that capitalism develops an economic order that could 
do without the State. And in fact capitalism is not short on 
war cries against the State, not only in the name of the 
market, but by virtue of its superior deterritorialization.30
26 ibid., p. 443-444.
27 ibid., p. 447.
28 ibid., p. 449.
29 ibid., p. 452.
30 ibid., p. 454.
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The truth of the matter is that “States, in capitalism, are not canceled out but change form 
and take on new meaning”31 (ie. deterritorialized), and capitalism becomes the new State 
realization. Even independent institutions are recoded by the forces of capitalism. 
Therefore, the modem State corresponds to capitalism and “corresponds as a process of 
subjection,”32 an apparatus of capture. Governmental programs, then, may be overridden 
by market concerns (reductions in educational spending that results in hikes in university 
tuition, for example). But this fact “is one very partial aspect of capital.”33
Prior to capitalism, apparatuses of capture had captured their citizens through 
processes of social subjection: cultural codes of tradition, practice, communal formation 
were imposed upon the citizen (the “divine right of kings”, for example, operated because 
the peasants were subjected to the belief that monarchies were ordained by God). 
Capitalism, however, captures its members through a process of machinic enslavement—a 
process that was only made possible through the technical realities of capitalism. 
Machinic enslavement, then, is a different apparatus of capture then social subjection. 
Social subjection, after all, has always existed. It was presupposed by the concept of the 
imperial and despotic State formations that subjected citizens through culture, slavery or 
serfdom. The capitalist State, however, has “through technological development... 
substituted an increasingly powerful social subjection for machinic enslavement”34 which 
has the power to recode individual desire.
Although machinic enslavement may bear many faces such as television, the 
internet, or the film industry, its immediate form is labour. Here the worker literally
31 ibid.
32 ibid., p. 456.
33 ibid.
34 ibid., p. 457.
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becomes the machine; the State has set itself up as a ‘ ‘human-machine system”35 where 
every person’s desire is required to allow capital to flow—consumption and production, as 
I will discuss in a later chapter, are the functions of this machine. Whereas early 
capitalism created a system where the worker was yoked to the machine, modem 
capitalism has birthed a new machinic enslavement which is the “reinvention of a 
machine of which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or 
users.”36
Both machinic enslavement and social subjection are forms of the apparatus of 
capture insofar as they ensnare individuals, and tie them to the State. Every single socius 
has, as aforementioned, used apparatuses of capture to attempt to program the 
consciousness of citizens to ensure that they act in such a way as to reproduce the system. 
In the ancient Greekpolis, for example, the social subjection of the slave served to 
negatively construct the “free” citizen. (This construction can be observed in Aristotle’s 
Politics where, in Book I for example, a distinction is emphasized between the master 
who is a “political animal”37, and slaves who are merely animals “help[ing] with their 
bodies to supply our essential needs.”38 The latter type of animal—excluded from politics 
and hence the polis—is “incapable of participating in the association which we call the 
state.”39) In the case of capitalism, in contrast, the apparatus of capture has reversed 
itself by defining the citizen as what it has captured. The free citizen of today-the 
individual who has societal worth—is one who has been enslaved to the machine.
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It would be wrong, though, to conceive of today’s machine as the machine found 
on the factory floor of early industrialism. The “machine” encompasses factory machines 
and workers and is in reality the social organization of work. Furthermore, the social 
organization of work extends beyond the factory and into the bureaucracies and the 
university classroom. The contemporary form of social organization is such that “human 
beings themselves are constituent pieces of a machine that they compose among 
themselves and with other things... under the control and direction of a higher unity.”40 
The higher unity is the capitalist State, and even the students at a university interact to 
compose this machine. In this manner, modem capitalism is a state-formation of the 
machine made flesh. The individual within the capitalist State does not use the machine 
but is the machine—and not in a post-modem “cyborg” manner, either. For the “cyborg” 
is the hybrid of human and machine—humans are not part machine, they are fully 
machine... they are robots. The term “robot” after all, originally meant “worker” and 
was employed in science fiction as a metaphor for the machine-like nature of workers.41 
And this is no utopian metaphor, as that of the “cyborg”; rather, it is a dystopian truth.
The State has always been a social machine and so it was only logical for the State 
to culminate in Capitalism, the era of the machine. Technological machines are 
everywhere, bureaucratic machines utilize these technical machines, and the human- 
machine is the singular unit. All of these micro-machines work the vast machine of the 
State, allowing capital to flow as its electricity.
In the early days of capitalism, Marx believed that the debilitating affects of work, 
under the factory machine, would cause the workers to eventually throw off their chains. 
But Marx was only aware of a world of labour where the machine was not yet fully born. 
How can the worker overcome the repressive machine when the worker is a micro-
40 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 457.
41 The “robot” was first created by science-fiction novelist Copek in his book R.U.R.
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machine which, in turn, is a component of the mega-machine—the socius? Moreover, the 
worker is not only the individual upon the factory floor, but the privileged student in the 
classroom, no less commodified, as we have just seen. The apparatus of capture revealed 
as machinic enslavement, according to Deleuze and Guattari, underlies the entire world- 
the assemblage of machines enlivened by capital.
The obvious regimentation and control which machinic enslavement implies, 
however, will be discussed in the next chapter. Here I want to focus on the notion of the 
capitalist apparatus of capture as a whole and how it is reflected by the university. The 
switch to a capitalist system, as Deleuze and Guattari have noted, created the illusion that 
free labour and independent capital overpowered the State, replacing it with the market. 
No doubt influenced by this concept of freedom, the liberal university’s philosophy is 
similar in that its agenda is to form “the man” and not “the citizen”42 —an individual who 
receives an education free of State concerns and is not taught as a mere member of this 
State. The capitalist system, however, merely changed the form of the State into that of a 
capitalist state; the market has become the dictator, and it is to this market that one must 
become subject if one is to be a proper citizen.43 Therefore, the liberal university’s 
“promotion of the best possible realization of humanity as humanity”44, is ultimately 
aimed at a “social efficiency”45 which is the governing imperative of the socius of 
capitalism. Hence, the student is still captured as a citizen, but as a different kind of 
citizen.
42 Dewey, p. 93.
4’ This being said, I realize that not all meaning is dictated by the market. But under a fascist dictatorship 
there is always a space o f dissent, a line of flight from the political regime.
44 Dewey, p. 95.
45 ibid., p. 119.
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Furthermore, the process of machinic enslavement exists within the university as 
the method of forming this free citizen, for “information... is also the property of the 
States that set themselves up as humans-machines systems.”46 The university as 
apparatus of capture is the land (ruled by the administration and the professor), work 
(defined by papers and exams), and money (defined by tuition, interest on student loans, 
and increasing privatisation). Defined by these three factors, the university also supports 
“the capitalist mode of production itself’, and thus by controlling information, 
stratification, and specialization it can place students within different faculties which are 
assigned importance due to their overall relation to the socius. Faculties like the arts are 
ascribed lesser value than the sciences and economics. The flows of capital which 
animate the university apparatus reveal this machinic processing. More of this social 
electricity is directed at what the capitalist State designates as possessing greater 
“instrumental value” 47 It is because of this fact that “it is the economic rather than the 
theoretical role of the university which is predominant.”48 Any examination of the 
corporate-university partnership, after all, reveals this predominance o f economic interest:
In this new academic order, basic research is sacrificed to 
applied programs of immediate benefit to the corporate 
structure. Research parks, priviate-sector liaisons...
Moneys subtracted from base operating budgets are 
reinjected back into programs of direct utility to high- 
technology capital.49
Since the university functions as an apparatus of capture, then, a structure of 
enslavement exists that allows the process of alienation to function adequately. As an
46 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 458.
47 Dewey, p. 243.
48 Cohn-Bendit, p. 43.
49 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
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apparatus of capture, after all, the university functions in a similar manner to the 
apparatus of the average workplace: “education [is] just as much [a part] of capital... as is 
the most elementary labour of the worker.”50 The student must be captured and 
commodified so that she can take her place in the economic world, managing or 
participating in the flows of capital. Moreover, the fact that the socius is a “human- 
machine system”—and this fact is reflected in the university—means that the comparison 
between the worker and the student, in the preceding section, is perhaps literally and not 
only analogously true; every citizen is a machine.
Finally, this machinic arrangement is evident in the reified structure of the 
university institution which exists as a capitalist spectacle affecting social separations—a 
capitalist delirium. While the preceding section examined the student, and this section 
examined the general institution, the following two sections—concerning, respectively, 
Lukacs and Debord—will analyze the relation of the commodified student to the 
university apparatus of capture.
Reification
In the first section of this chapter, the student was likened to Marx’s alienated 
worker. In the preceding section the concept of the apparatus of capture was analyzed in 
relation to the university. Deleuze and Guattari capture the essential structure of the 
commodified student, but the exact relation between student and institution still needs to 
be discussed. This force of commodification and capitalist socialization is a problem in 
so far as the university presents itself as a free institution. But “there is no problem,” 
writes Georg Lukacs, “ .. .and there is no solution [to this problem] that could not be 
found in the solution to the riddle of commodity-structure,”̂  In the socius of capitalism,
50 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
51 Lukacs, p. 83.
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society is founded on the structure of the commodity and the university is, as an apparatus 
of capture, merely another institution that replicates this commodity-structure. The 
relation of the student to this apparatus, however, is evident in the reified structure of the 
university. It is important to investigate the meaning of Lukacs theory in light of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s apparatus o f capture and how it relates to the university system.
The basis of commodity-structure is, for Lukacs, reification. As he defines it, 
reification is:
a relation between people [that] takes on the character of a 
thing and thus acquires a ‘phantom objectivity’, an 
autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing 
as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the 
relation between people.52
This reification is primarily evident in the capitalist market but, since the university is a 
reflection of the capitalist system, reification appears in this institution as well. Lukacs 
antipates this fact when he writes, “the commodity structure [has] penetrate[d] society in 
all its aspects and [has] remould[ed] it in its own image.”53
This universal category of the commodity is evident in the university both 
subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, as we have seen, the university student has 
sunk to the level of the commodity. Objectively, the university appears as “a world of 
objects and relations between things’,54-the  world of the market reflected in the 
university bureaucracy, administration, and academic structure. The knowledge a student 
possesses about the laws of administration and proper academic procedure may be used 
“to his own advantage but he is not able to modify the process by his own activity.”55
52 ibid.
53 ibid., p. 85.
54 ibid., p. 87.
55 ibid.
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Once again, the student possesses a measure of liberty within the university institution, 
but is ultimately bound by its rules.
Thus we discover a student that has been captured within a world of social 
relations that have become things. The regulation and structure of the university is, in 
reality, nothing more than a reflection of social relations. In the university, specialization 
and rationalization are manifested in an apparatus of capture with “a continuous trend 
towards greater rationalisation”56 and specialization. We could describe this as a trend 
towards machinic enslavement. The educational process in itself is nothing more than a 
social relation between a teacher and a student. But when the capitalist university 
administration organizes this process it becomes a specialized a system with its own rules 
and regulations—bureaucratic procedures, channels of authority, and the fragmentation 
and categorization of knowledge (the faculties of Science, departments of Philosophy, 
etc.). This rationalized fragmentation of the object into various specialized fields “entails 
the fragmentation of its subject”57, the student. The student, then, does not appear as an 
agent of his own education; he “is a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical 
system”58 which appears as if it is “pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions 
independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not.”59 
Furthermore, the student is taught that “the fate of the worker [has become] the 
fate of society as a whole”60 in that her education is always presented to her as a tool for 
which to get ajob-that education is only about the job market. Thus the students are 
captured as workers, managers, or the next generation of professors. For although not
56 ibid., p. 88.
57 ibid., p. 89.
58 ibid.
59 ibid.
60 ibid., p. 91.
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every faculty promotes social integration, the academic structure demands it: loans need 
to be repaid, and degrees retain the identity of an exchange value. To continue “putting 
off the real world” (for the real world is always the world of work, not its shadow) one 
must confront a reified, bureaucratic and academic structure: it is easier to leave and find 
ajob than proceed to graduate school. Thus the socius depends on the university for “the 
emergence of the ‘free’ worker who is able to take his [education] to market and offer it 
for sale as a commodity ‘belonging’ to him, a thing that he ‘possesses’.”61
In terms of commodification and machinic enslavement, social relations have 
become things precisely because the modem student, like the modem worker, is a thing, a 
robot. The apparatus of capture ensures that students will become cogs in the capitalist 
machine, creating “a form for the state and a system of law corresponding to its needs and 
harmonising with its own structure.”62 The apparatus of capture is evident in the fact 
that the university is ingrained “more fatefully and more definitively in the consciousness 
of [the student]”63—it has become reified. In this manner it tmly seems to emanate from 
the capitalist recording process as part of a “unified structure of consciousness that 
embraced the whole society, brought it into being.”64 This structure is the economic 
structure, the commodity-structure, of the capitalist State.
Spectacular society
With the reified university standing over and above the student, the student 
becomes involved in a process of spectacular separation from the very institution within 
which she was supposed to be engaged. “In societies where modem conditions of
61 ibid.
62 ibid., p. 95
63 ibid., p. 93.
64 ibid., p. 100.
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production prevail,” writes Guy Debord, “all of life presents itself as an immense 
accumulation of spectacles .”65 Debord’s concept of the spectacle is the theoretical child 
of Marx and Lukacs—an expansion on the themes of commodification and reification.
For Debord, spectacular society implies that “[ejverything that was directly lived has 
moved away into a representation”66 due to the accumulation of image-objects which 
affect social separation. Such an analysis of society, however, should not be construed as 
a media critique (the “spectacle” only referring to something like television). Although 
the media may be part of social separation, the spectacle “cannot be understood as an 
abuse of the world of vision, as a product of the techniques of mass dissemination of 
images.”67
Rather, the concept of the spectacle, for Debord, is a key concept to understanding 
the socius. It is Lukacs’ idea of reification expanded to encompass the social whole.
With the commodity penetrating all aspects of life, the capitalist world vision has become 
integrated with and made identical to reality. (As Deleuze and Guattari claim, capitalism 
has become a delirium; it is true consciousness of a false reality, or a dream of the 
commodity which is masquerading as reality.) Thus, “[tjhe spectacle form and content 
are identically the total justification of the existing system’s conditions and goals.”68 
Debord defines the spectacle as “not a collection of images, but a social relation among 
people, mediated by images.”69 In other words, the images of commodities and capital 
have defined reality and constructed “its own delirium by recording the process of
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production”.70 As we can see, Debord’s position is a clear extension of Lukacs’ concept 
of reification.
The liberal university is, as an apparatus of capture, a spectacle; “it is specifically 
the sector which concentrates all gazing and consciousness.”71 Primarily the university is 
a social relation among people, but its reified nature is maintained by the mediation of 
images. Once again, these “images” should not be misunderstood as media 
representations (although, in spectacular society at large, such representations are a type 
of image), but as image-objects: information and education which reflect and disseminate 
capitalist ideology—the capitalist imagination, the social delirium. Although a certain 
critical freedom is permissible, and even promoted, within the university, the institution’s 
nature as an apparatus of capture is such that “there remains nothing... which has not 
been transformed, and polluted, according to the means and interests of modem 
industry.”72 Since modem industry is not a necessary cause of our existence—but we 
believe it is so because it has been reified—it has, indeed, polluted the whole of life. 
Therefore, the information one absorbs within the university gains its social importance 
from the rules of the socius: from how it aids social integration 73 So you ’re studying 
philosophy? What job will that get you? The option of this educational process is 
presented in the following manner: either your education gets you a job, or your education 
is worthless. (I will argue in the third chapter that this assertion is not an overstatement 
but the truth of the current educational model.)
70 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 10.
71 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 3.
72 Debord, Comments on the Society of the Spectacle, p. 10.
73 This fact shall be illuminated further in the Chapter which discusses “knowledge-capital” .
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For Debord, the capitalist market has accomplished “the globalisation of the 
false... [and] the falsification of the globe”74 through spectacular domination. The vast 
majority of information, no matter what its nature, may be appropriated by the socius and 
used to separate people into spectators of capitalism, integrating them into the socius. 
Thus, although the university maintains an inner core of critical freedom, the spectacle 
nature of the institution isolates and assassinates this freedom. Information which 
contains a radical agenda, for example, can by rendered impotent by the ‘free’ discourse 
of liberalism—by being transformed into a representation of itself, a mere category of 
critical knowledge the same as any other category: “the Frankfurt School”, “Third-World 
Marxism”, “Feminism”, “Post-colonial studies”, etc. Literature that contains a radical 
critique, then, is reduced to a theoretical image of its original intent. A social separation, 
therefore, is affected amongst students and their education. It is possible, as a university 
student, to be a “Marxist” and a capitalist at the same time. One can use revolutionary 
thought as a theoretical construct for mere criticism, locking up the social critique within 
the realm of the imagination. It is for this reason that “[r] evolutionary theory is now the 
enemy of all revolutionary ideology”.75
The freedom found in the liberal university, then, is a freedom of contemplation 
surrounded by machinic enslavement. It is a freedom that must follow the rules of the 
apparatus of capture. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari could write their social critiques within 
the university institution as long as these critiques followed the rules of this institution, 
using the language of the spectacle which “consists of signs of the ruling production, 
which at the same time are the ultimate goal of this production.”76 This fact also explains 
why I can write this paper; the spectacle is such that, “[w]hen analyzing the spectacle one
74 Debord, Comments..., p. 10.
75 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 124.
76 ibid., 7.
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speaks to some extent, the language of the spectacular itself’77, reinforcing its power by 
moving through its methodological territory. Through the university, then, “the 
spectacle’s domination has succeeded in raising a whole generation molded to its laws.”78
Finally, the separation perfected by the mediation of images is evident in the 
alienation and commodification of the student discussed in the first section of this 
chapter: the students have been separated from other students and from their very selves. 
Moreover, spectacular society separates individuals in order to reduce them to specific 
machine cogs for the socius: university specialisation captures students as managers, 
engineers, computer programmers, scientists, in order to maintain the overall system.
And the “success of [this] economic system of separation is the proletarianization of the 
world.”79
Increasing corporatisation
The reified spectacle of the university apparatus of capture can be empirically 
confirmed by examining the increasingly corporate structure of the university. “By 
1900,” writes Stanley Aronowitz in his study The Knowledge Factory, “the university- 
corporate complex was in full bloom. The two aspects of this relationship, that 
universities adopt the business ethic and more directly serve business by training cadres 
for industry was well described by contemporary observers”80 Since the beginning of the 
twentieth century, then, “the trend toward integration of the university and [capitalist]
77 ibid., 9.
78 Debord, Comments..., p. 7.
79 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 26.
80 Aronowitz, p. 16-17.
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society [became] irreversible and desirable.”81 Indeed, one can confirm Aronowitz’s 
observations by examining the discourses of the defenders of business and capital.
One key illustration is Renovating the Ivory Tower, an empirical study by various 
authors which is edited by David Laidler, a “Bank of Montreal Professor at the University 
of Western Ontario” and a member of the “Canadian Bankers Association”.82 The object 
of this book is to discuss university policy in light of the knowledge economy. Although 
Laidler’s study is driven by an ideology which is antithetical to the idea of the university 
as a site of critical inquiry, the information contained within its pages is invaluable. 
Furthermore, even though these are not the only participants in the university debate they 
are a paradigmatic example of the current strain of liberal educational theory and, as the 
study itself attests, are also paradigmatic of the group that holds the most influence. 
Laidler and his contributors agree (and produce research to prove) that the university “is 
committed to developing and enhancing human capital”83, but they believe this 
commitment is justified. They believe, like Dewey, that the university must exist as a 
training ground for social integration and efficiency. Thus, “the increasing 
rationalisation” warned of by Lukacs is accepted by Laidler and his associates and, 
indeed, promoted. The majority of this study, then, is aimed at investigating how the 
university contributes to the GDP through the production of human capital. Numerous 
figures throughout the study84 reveal that the university’s participation in the economy 
has grown, especially in the United States. As Canadian economists, the contributors of 
Laidler’s study champion the US model, claiming that Canadian universities, although
81 ibid., p. 34.
82 Laidler, back cover.
83 Laidler, p. 80.
84 see, for example, p. 51-52 concerning economic standards of living.
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proceeding along the same lines as their neighbours, need to become more like their 
American counterparts.
Examining the financial state of the university, Laidler claims in his introduction 
that, while these institutions “are certainly under considerable financial pressure... if they 
are to receive more resources, it must be shown that the money would be well spent.”85 
By “well spent” Laidler means spent on what he perceives to be the important areas of 
education (business, computers, engineering, scientific research) which will cause a 
greater output of human capital than is presently taking place:
the spectacular... economic performance of the 1990s was 
the result of developments in high-technology activities 
[and] is well grounded in fact. And because these activities 
involve using highly educated workers to exploit new 
developments in science and engineering, it is 
understandable that another popular notion has developed— 
namely, that the key to securing a rising standard of living at 
the turn of the millennium lies in the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge.86
Laidler’s focus on exploiting scientific developments is merely an echo of Dewey’s call 
for controlling the technological reality. But while Dewey desired a holistic form of 
education that included a diversity of faculties, Laidler and his associates, although 
granting that the liberal university already has economic worth want to refocus the 
university on only those faculties that can justify themselves economically. The ‘liberal 
model’ for the Laidler crew appears to mean something different than it does for Dewey; 
while Dewey’s model was concerned with the cultivation of the citizen, the former 
group’s model is concerned with economic programming.
85 Laidler, p. 6.
86 ibid., p. 7.
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Although the authors of the Laidler study see themselves as part of the liberal 
education tradition, their concern with economic programming is perhaps due to the 
influence of concepts they have borrowed from the “information revolution” or 
“postindustrialism”, an ideology championed by neo-liberal academics like Daniel Bell 
and Alvin Toffler. This specific ideology claims that “[t]he most important agents in this 
postindustrial society would be scientists, engineeers, and administrators, a new 
‘knowledge class’ lodged primarily within government and academia, bearers of the 
rationalist skills and virtues required by increasing organizational and technological 
complexity.”87 The Laidler study’s obsession with the knowledge economy is a result of 
this “information revolution” influence, yet is not divorced from the liberal project 
represented by Dewey. For just as Dewey desired to create an educational model that 
would improve society, so postindustrialism desires to “create an epoch of rationalized 
integration and prosperity, which, while not without its own problems, would finally 
escape from the material want, economic crisis, and class conflict of the industrial era.”88 
In light of this postindustrialist ideology, Laidler’s study argues that, “the concept 
of human capital has been central to the economic analysis of education for about 40 
years,” and yet goes on to say that in places like Canada the production of human capital 
is lagging behind. Moreover, this study argues that increasing corporatization, and 
funding for the areas deemed important by business, is what liberal education was 
supposed to be about to begin with:
The ‘new economy’ is said to be a ‘knowledge economy’, 
and within it, universities [have been] presented as having 
special roles to play as creators of new ideas in their 
research function and as producers of human capital
87 Dyer-Witheford, p. 18. The ideology of postindustrialism and its relation to liberalism/neo­
liberalism is both summarized in Dyer-Witheford’s book, and exposed for being the ideology that 
helped lay the foundations for the current era of capitalism.
88 ibid.
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capable of exploiting those ideas in their teaching function.
In this way of looking at things, the output of universities is 
a vital input into the material progress of the market 
economy.89
This connection illustrates precisely what I mean by the university being an apparatus of 
capture: it produces commodified students in order to capture them for the market 
economy as “human capital.” Associating Lukacs’ concept of the ‘free’ worker with the 
student, then, is not a misleading analogy. Laidler himself maintains that the university is 
aimed at “the emergence of the ‘free’ worker who is able to take his [education] to market 
and offer it for sale as a commodity ‘belonging’ to him, a thing that he ‘possesses’.”90 
Furthermore, due to the fact that Laidler’s study assumes the university’s 
traditional liberal role, it just takes as given that “the role of universities... [is] to produce 
both human and knowledge capital that yields significant private returns.”91 Laidler’s 
study also illustrates what I mean by reification: a “phantom objectivity” has been given 
to the university as an economic machine, and nowhere in Laidler’s study is this 
economic identity even questioned. Laidler also uses the term “knowledge capital” 
without irony, apparently oblivious to the fact that Deleuze and Guattari were using it 
nearly forty years earlier in Anti-Oedipus in order to critique the liberal educational 
system—forty years which mirrors Laidler’s own historical claim, mentioned above, about 
the concept of human capital being an intrinsic part of educational theory for the last four 
decades. For Laidler, then, increasing corporatization has been happening for around four 
decades and he and his associates gleefully predict that it will and should continue.
It is with this economic study in mind that the aforementioned study by Aronowitz 
can assert that “the university has become virtually identical with the transnational
89 Laidler, p. 8.
90 ibid.
91 ibid., p. 36.
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corporations ... that serve as a kind of surrogate state.”92 If the university is becoming a 
business venture, then the interests of capital have become unified with education. This 
change is what allows Laidler and his associates to refer to the university as an institution 
in the “knowledge economy,” and to students as “human capital.”
Furthermore, the commodification of the student and her education is evident in 
the increasing automation of this “knowledge economy”. In Digital Diploma Mills, 
author David Noble examines the increase of online university education. He contends 
that these online courses are, in essence, “the commodification of higher education, of 
which computer technology is merely the latest medium”.93 Online education is a 
lucrative enterprise for a number of reasons: the students can be kept from a campus 
which requires, among many things, building and grounds maintenance, and professors 
can be reduced to cheap commodity status as well. This trend of educational automation 
ultimately adds to the students’ alienation:
[the students’ education is] removed or ‘alienated’ from 
[its] original context, the actual education process itself, 
and from [its] producers, the teachers, and [is] assembled as 
‘courses’, which take on an existence independent of and 
apart from those who gave [it] flesh... The alienation of 
ownership of and control over course material (through 
surrender of copyright) is crucial to this step.94
This increasing trend of the automation of the university, then, is a contemporary 
example of how the university reflects and harbours the interests of capital. The 
alienation and commodification of the student is accomplished by enslaving her to a 
machine-the computer—just like a factory worker. Spectacular social separation will be 
perfected through online education. Students will be separated into commodified spaces
92 Aronowitz, p. 6.
93 Noble, p. 1.
94 ibid., p. 3.
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along with their teachers, and the whole institution will run like a factory: “speedup, 
routinization of work, greater work discipline and managerial supervision... Thus, the 
commoditization of instruction leads invariably to the ‘'proletarianization ’ [of the 
university]”95 an inevitability since, according to Debord, the whole world is becoming 
proletarianized under the forces of capitalism—all societal positions are becoming part of 
the oppressed class.
It is these forces of capitalism, then, that underlie the increase of university 
automation as an apparatus of capture. Machinic enslavement becomes even more 
evident as the students confront a reified education through their computers—reified 
because it is no longer dependent upon the social relations between professors and 
students. That relation is abstracted into icons and hypertext on a screen. Although the 
relation between professors and students contributes to alienation, the professor class in 
some cases buffers the complete capitalist control of the administration. Enslavement 
increases, then, with the elimination of the professors and the subjection of the students to 
just the administration. Thus the university reflects the working world and students can 
be easily trained—captured— in order to take their place in the spectacular economic 
reality. Therefore, university automation is just another example which proves that, “as 
universities have become corporate in their structure as well as in their curriculum, they 
advance the indeterminate goal of ‘excellence’ to which the [transnational corporations] 
are pledged.”96
The alienation, commodification, and enslavement of the student under the reified 
capitalistic apparatus of this “knowledge economy”, however, should not obscure another 
question: who is being denied education? As aforementioned, the liberal university is 
populated, mainly, by the privileged classes-it would be a mistake to “revel in [student]
95 Noble, p. 4, emphasis added.
96 Aronowitz, p. 6.
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alienation... attracting] the sympathy of a society indifferent to much more poignant 
suffering throughout the world.”97
University education is, first and foremost, a privilege of the developed countries. 
But obviously there are those in these developed countries, despite student loans, who 
cannot afford university education. Furthermore, there are those whose life and social 
setting provide them with sub-standard public education, and they are forced to compete 
with students who have access to private high schools and who do not need to work to 
afford to live, or scrape together the large amount of money required for university 
tuition. The implications of this fact extend further than admission to the university. The 
less wealthy the student, the more she must work to continue her worth as a commodified 
student. Increasing tuition rates and threats of privatisation will make this reality even 
worse. The liberal model of the university is constructed for the wealthy and, hence, 
affects the freedom of the underprivileged.
What should be noted at this point, then, is that, although university is aimed at 
the privileged classes, these privileged students are produced as privileged commodities, 
that is, the next generation of bosses:
[the university’s] function is to condition students so that 
they will fit into the economic and social system, as mere 
puppets dancing to the tune of technocrats, of men busily 
organizing the misery of the underdeveloped countries and 
the affluence of the rest.98
Therefore, although the majority of students’ commodity status is privileged they are in a 
similar conceptual status as the underprivileged; they are socialized and inserted into their 
proper position in order to maintain the overall system. Maintaining the system means 
organizing and recording “the flows of code” that keep the capitalist reality functioning.
97 Cohn-Bendit, p. 26.
98 ibid., p. 30.
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And perhaps this is what Guy Debord means when he writes of a proletarianization o f the 
world due to “growing capitalist alienation at all levels”.99
Conclusion
The fact that North American university education is fast becoming a profit- 
oriented institution is a result of its existence as part of the capitalist socius. And in this 
chapter I have examined the university as a capitalist institution by applying Marx’s 
concept of alienation to the student, expanded upon that analogy with the concepts of 
apparatus of capture, reification, and spectacular society, and—to a certain degree—• 
empirically illustrated my argument. It is this capitalist nature of the university which not 
only alienates the students and professors but which, through tuition hikes, a privilege for 
the elite—an elite that, under the forces of capitalism, is socialized, processed, and 
controlled.
99 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 122.
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CHAPTER TWO
regimentation and control
“ A  society f o i l  o f prisons... Anything else which is 
outside o f the needs o f  the capitalist society are given 
no place. The great many people who can no longer 
live here, or who no longer want to-and there are 
many people who choose to end their lives every day— 
speak o f the emptiness o f the system and the hardness 
in the society.”
Red Army Faction, Statement o f  the RAF  
(the 1998 disbanding o f  the R ed Army 
Faction)
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the university is an apparatus of capture that, 
through processes of alienation and reification, binds the student to capitalism. With 
social and economic integration as this institution’s general aim, the university produces a 
student commodity that is regimented in such a way so as to fit into the structure of 
society. This institution “chum[s] out the trained personnel that is so essential for 
bureaucratic capitalism.”1 The aim of this chapter is to examine the capitalist 
regimentation which exists within the liberal university.
To begin, let us return to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of machinic enslavement. 
As an apparatus of capture, the university captures the student commodity in order to bind 
her to the economic reality of capitalist society. This aim was evident in the philosophy 
of Dewey, in his claim that the general aim of education is “social efficiency... [and] the 
importance of industrial competency.”2 It was reiterated in the Laidler study through its 
analysis of the student as “human capital”. The mode of capture by which the current 
socius defines its citizens is machinic enslavement, “the reinvention of a machine of 
which human beings are constituent parts, instead of subjected workers or users.”3 The
1 Cohn-Bendit, p. 41.
2 Dewey, p. 119.
3 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 458.
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student is captured as a micro-machine—a robot—and is thus easily regimented and 
controlled. This machine is always programmable, upgradeable, fixable, and arrangeable.
Furthermore, a machine is ultimately profitable because it fits into a socius, which 
is nothing but a composition of similar machines. In other words, the socius only permits 
machines that it can integrate seamlessly; one machine can always replace another. Those 
trained at universities are, by and large, trained in order to fit into the social machine 
which, in turn, profits from their machinic nature: they are already regimented and 
trained. They already possess the proper work ethic. In this chapter I will further 
develop the notion of machinic enslavement through Foucault’s theories of discipline, 
which will form a general description of regimentation. Behind the general process of 
discipline and regimentation in the university, however, is the face of capitalism. In the 
second section I will elaborate on the concepts of discipline with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept offaciality. The third section will discuss Debord’s analysis of capitalist space 
and will examine how the actual territory of the university is regimented and disciplined 
by the face of capitalism. The fourth and final section of this chapter will deal with the 
regimentation of educational information itself.
Discipline
The university is a disciplinary institution in two senses. First of all, students are 
trained to aim themselves at a discipline, that is, an area of study or a vocation.
Discipline should not be misunderstood as some form of parental punishment (although 
this may overlap), but in terms of regimentation and control. Secondly, the student 
regiments or disciplines herself in order to succeed within the university. That is, she 
trains herself in a discipline (science, history, mathematics, philosophy, etc.). It was 
Foucault who first defined discipline in this way. In Discipline & Punish Foucault writes:
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The exercise of discipline presupposes a mechanism that 
coerces by means of observation; an apparatus in which the 
techniques that make it possible to see induce effects of 
power, and in which, conversely, the means of coercion 
make those on whom they are applied clearly visible.4
As the first chapter discussed, the university is such a mechanism since it exists as an 
“apparatus” of capture. The regimentation of this institution is clearly visible in the sense 
that many of those whom it captures for the socius are products of their education: the 
scientist, the lawyer, the medical doctor, the historian, etc. As graduates, they practice a 
discipline.
In this section I will examine aspects ofFoucault’s theory of discipline in relation 
to the liberal university. I do not, however, wish to get bogged down in a discussion of 
Foucault’s genealogical method that informs his concepts. Rather than investigating 
discipline in light of the history of power/knowledge, I will investigate certain areas of 
Discipline & Punish in light of “the reinvention of a machine of which human beings are 
constituent parts”. In order to analyze Foucault in this specific manner, I will focus on 
the following areas: the art o f distributions, the control o f activity, the organization o f  
geneses, and the composition o f forces. Finally, this section will conclude with the 
disciplinary function of the examination.
Discipline, for Foucault, “proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space”5 
and, therefore, requires a number of techniques. This distribution is first defined by an 
enclosure which serves as a “protected place of disciplinary monotony”.6 In regards to 
the university, such an enclosure is the space in which the university exists—the campus— 
which encloses the buildings of this institution. Furthermore, this enclosure needs
4 Foucault, p. 171.
5 ibid., p. 141.
6 ibid.
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machinery that will regiment the individuals within the space by divisions and 
compartments—rows of desks, for example. Disciplinary space also requires functional 
sites7 that are given specific regimental uses. Examples of these sites are the professors’ 
offices, different classrooms, and different faculties. Out of this fiinctionalization certain 
useful spaces are bom: the university classroom, for example, serves the specific function 
of lecturing (if one is the professor) and listening (if one is the student). Although it is 
true that teaching practices might occasionally differ, this lecture-listen method of 
teaching—what Freire calls the banking method of teaching (which turn students into 
‘“receptacles’ to be ‘filled’ by the teacher”8)—is the normal function of the disciplinary 
space of the classroom. Finally, discipline distributes itself as an “art of rank”9 by 
creating “a network of relations”10: the professor, the graduate student, the student, and 
the secretary, for example, all possess different modes of relating to one another.
Different rituals of discourse evolve between these occupations determined by relative 
positions in the hierarchy.
The second general function of discipline is the control of activity. One method 
of control is the time-table that teaches one to discipline and regiment one’s time. This 
scheduling has obviously taken root in the university when one considers the time-tables 
students must create for themselves each year, scheduling classes into their proper spots, 
“establishing] rhythms... regulat[ing] the cycles of repetition”.11 Another method of 
activity control is the temporal elaboration o f the act12 in which the repetition of activity
7 ibid., p. 143.
8 Freire, p. 53.
9 Foucault, p. 146.
10 ibid.
11 ibid., p. 149.
12 ibid. p. 151.
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over time produces a type of specialization. The student, for example, learns to elaborate 
her writing style by continuous essay writing and rewriting. Although Foucault discusses 
two other methods by which activity is controlled,13 these do not really relate to the 
university institution, and so I will just discuss one more: exhaustive use.14 Under this 
principle of activity discipline we find the idea of “positive economy”15 —the student 
should use time wisely, should study whenever possible, and should fill up her schedule 
with activities that appear impressive on a graduate school, grant, or job application.
The next general function of discipline for Foucault is the organization of 
geneses—of categories, of divisions-where “[t]he [aforementioned] disciplines, which 
analyse space, break up and rearrange activities, must also be understood as machinery 
for adding up and capitalizing time.”16 As a whole, the university institution is organized 
in such a way as to manage student distribution and activity in a profitable manner. 
Degrees are general time markers which represent student turn-over: as students leave 
university in order to be integrated into the economic world, the institution receives more 
capital from arriving students. Even the worth of professors is organized in this 
regimental manner; if  they serve their time and do their job properly they may receive 
tenure.
Discipline as a whole functions as a composition of forces, “a machine whose 
effect will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it 
is composed.”17 In other words, the disciplinary institution utilizes all of its disciplinary 
forces to function as a single machine. Therefore regimentation is no longer mere
13 correlation of the body and the gesture, the body-object articulation.
14 Foucault, p. 154.
15 ibid.
16 ibid., p. 157.
17 ibid., p. 164.
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distribution, but “an efficient machine”18 or, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, an 
apparatus of capture. Within this composition an individual is an element which can be 
arranged, along with time, in a machinic sequence. As was evidenced in the first chapter, 
the university is one such sequenced machine. Furthermore, “[tjhis carefully measured 
combination of forces requires a precise system of command... [in which one perceives a 
given] signal and [reacts] to it immediately, according to a more or less artificial, 
prearranged code.”19 The entire university runs according to such compositions of 
signals. For example, when the clock hand signals a certain time, students react with 
nervousness, or when a large package arrives in the mail, say, in answer to some grant 
application, students react with happiness, as opposed to the disappointment generated by 
a slim envelope. Professors signal their students’ worth with letters and marks, which a 
student does not necessarily have to understand but must accept. Certain marks are 
recognized as excellent, others mediocre, others merely passing grades (to which many a 
student reacts with elation), and still others signal failure. All of the previous forms of 
discipline, then, are arranged in order to compose one large apparatus of capture. 
Although the university apparatus is not identitical to other institutions or to the state 
itself, it plays an integral part, namely, to produce individuals in such a way that their 
later insertion into the social machine is as seamless as possible.
Finally, the examination is a form of discipline that “makes it possible to qualify, 
to classify and to punish.”20 Methods of university examination regiment students into 
quantifiable categories (the honours student, the average student, the failure) and thus 
“holds them in a mechanism of objectification.”21 Students are defined by a “field of
18 ibid.
19 ibid., p. 166.
20 ibid., p. 184.
21 ibid., p. 187.
45
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
documentation.”22 Such a process, then, allows for an individual to be formalized within 
a structure of power relations. The student knows her place and her worth by the grade 
point average examinations create, and bureaucratic documentation develops a permanent 
academic record in which the student’s marks will define a field of possibilities within 
which she must navigate. If the grade point average on this record is high than she will 
be worthy of grants or continuing education. Obviously, higher academic achievement 
does not imply a greater mechanization. Many students may work to score higher in 
order to stay within the regimentally bounded world of academic freedom. The problem, 
however, is that in order to avoid being integrated fully into the social machine students 
have to play an academic game (they have to leap through certain hoops and subject 
themselves to a disciplinary procedure). In this manner, the student becomes a “case 
which at one and the same time constitutes an object for a branch of knowledge and a 
hold for a branch of power.”23 The student is the case or the end product of her 
discipline. She is the “effect and object of [the] knowledge”24 that she has accumulated 
within the university. All of these methods of discipline, which affect strict 
regimentation, might allow one to say, along with Foucault, that “schools... resemble 
prisons”.25
Faciality
All methods of discipline and regimentation are based on a face—a signifying 
regime that has crystallized into a recognizable system. Faciality, then, refers to a system 
that is engendered by recognizable features. “Architecture,” for example, “positions its
22 ibid., p. 189.
23 ibid., p. 191.
24 ibid., p. 192.
25 ibid., p. 228, emphasis added.
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ensembles—houses, towns or cities, monuments or factories—to function like faces in the 
landscape they transform.”26 This idea is not to be confused with schools of architecture 
or the specific differences between houses and highrises but should rather be understood 
as a comment on human psychology and class difference. We construct our world to 
resemble ourselves. We project our face everywhere. But just what is this face  that we 
project upon our world? According to Deleuze and Guattari faciality  always carries a 
specific socio-political function. As part of the social machine, we allow our system to 
operate as a certain faciality machine.
The aim of this section is to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concept offaciality, 
and how it “reigns materially over that whole constellation of significances and 
interpretations”27 which compose the university. In the first chapter the university was 
described as a capitalist apparatus of capture, and so the face of the university system 
possesses a capitalistic nature. It is important, then, to first examine “the relation of the 
face to the... machine that produces it, and the relation of the face to the assemblages of 
power that require that social production. The face is a politics.,,,2S In order to fully 
understand the concept offaciality, we must first understand Deleuze and Guattari’s 
analysis of the signifying order of capitalism, or the signs capitalism uses to represent the 
world. What Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a signifying regime forms the background 
for their concept o f  faciality, for a face “is a politics” that is formed by the organization 
and stratification of a signifying order. Thus, after discussing capitalist representation, 
this section will discuss the facialization of this signifying order in regards to the
26 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 172.
27 ibid., p. 115.
28 ibid., p. 181, emphasis added.
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university apparatus which “produces a particular kind of representation whose elements 
are organized at [its] surface”29 as its face.
“Writing,” claim Deleuze and Guattari, “has never been capitalism’s thing. 
Capitalism is profoundly illiterate.”30 The signifying order of capitalism, then, is not that 
of books (as it was in, for example, a despotic order-books of the law, or religious texts). 
Even though capitalism continues to appropriate this order of representation “adapted to 
money as the general equivalent”31 it does so as an archaism. The capitalist language, 
however, is realized through “the appearance of the technical means of expression”32: 
market figures, numerical quantifications, advertising images, etc. The archaic language 
system of writing, therefore, is only utilized in so far as it is useful to capitalism’s specific 
order (the slogan tied to the commodity image, for example) and only if  it serves this 
order rather than the rules of writing. I do not want to get sidetracked into the realm of 
the philosophy of language, but I think that we can presuppose certain “rules of writing”: 
rules of grammar, specific definitions of words, and basic logic are the key to most 
written works, especially in the academic vein. Appropriated by the capitalist order of 
representation, writing follows the rules of money and market rather than the basic rules 
listed above. Expressions which would have, previously, been inane acquire a new 
meaning under capitalism (“be an individual, drink Pepsi”), and writing and reading 
evoke the language of the market-every day phrases refer the listener to a product (ie. 
“nobody’' reminds one of Bad Boy Furniture).
29 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 262,
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Thus, the capitalist order of representation, its regime of signs, ‘“ speaks’ only in 
the language of signs imposed on it by merchant capital or the axiomatic of the market”.33 
Due to this fact, the capitalist system of signification can always change in response to 
market changes, that is, shift its codes in order to allow a “cordoning off of production 
through information.”34 The language codes of writing require extra-economic factors, 
reasons and justifications to labour, to produce, to educate oneself, etc. The pre-capitalist 
states in which writing was important, for example, would base a citizen’s subservience 
to the ruler through evidence provided in religious texts: the gods require your 
submission. For the epoch of despotism a system of signs or a regime to affect social 
subjection through specific cultural codes was still used to control the citizens. Such a 
social subjection, though, was still centred on the rules of writing; one’s submission to 
the gods could be ‘proven’ by rhetoric and sophistry. There can be no real consideration 
of extra-economic factors in capitalism, however, since the market is the prime 
representational order that has been, as discussed in regards to Lukacs, reified. Thus, a 
multinational company like Pepsi can glorify the value of individualism at one point 
while, at another, sell its product with an appeal to the community of “the Pepsi 
generation”. While both the capitalist and pre-capitalist signifying regimes are regimes 
that support an apparatus of capture, the regime has changed, and this regime is organized 
as the dominant face  of capitalism. In the preceding chapter the rules of capitalist 
representation were evident in regards to the economic study produced by Laidler and his 
associates. Although their study was a written text, it bore this face of capitalism- 
quantifiable economic figures served as its basis, and this economic basis is never 
questioned. Ronald Bogue, a scholar of Deleuze and Guattari, aptly sums up these rules 
of the capitalist regime of signs:
33 ibid., p. 241.
34 ibid.
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The capitalist sign, in other words, means nothing, but 
simply functions within the economic process as a medium 
for transcoding and co-ordinating various components of 
the circuit of production, exchange, distribution, and 
consumption. A flow of electricity, for example can be 
conjoined with a flow of words, a flow of images, a flow of 
music, or a flow of digital commands controlling any 
number of technical machines; but the conjoined flows 
never mean anything.35
In terms of the university, one would expect that the facialized order of 
representation found in writing would form the face of this institution. Although the rules 
of writing are an important signifying order (for example, the academic essay, the books 
on the reading list) these rules are important insofar as they serve the capitalist order. 
Social efficiency and economic integration are the rules of the university apparatus, and 
the general aim of all of this writing is to achieve a degree that may be used in exchange 
for a job. Moreover, the language of writing is an archaism, because in faculties like the 
humanities which promote the most amount of reading and writing are not viewed as 
worthy of as much funding. The language of capitalism has categorized the university, 
“and in learning [this] language one must to some extent accept the codes—codes of 
privilege, power, domination, exclusion, and so on—inherent in the language.”36
The archaism of writing is even more evident when one considers the automation 
o f higher education discussed by Noble. Examining the rise of internet university 
education, Noble writes, “[ojnce faculty put their course material online... the knowledge 
and course design skill embodied in that material is taken out of their possession [and] 
transferred to the machinery”.37 The online university replaces writing and academic
35 Bogue, p. 102.
36 ibid., p. 136.
37 Noble, p. 32.
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exchange with the technical signs of capitalism. One works within a digital field which is 
a perfect landscape for capitalist commercialization (ie. web advertising) and which 
replaces the archaic writing process with a machinic function. The learning process, then, 
becomes attached to an economic factor. The method of pedagogy matters less than the 
capital that can be generated by this new system. Therefore, online education “herald[s] a 
new regime in higher education, one that is taking hold of the nation’s campuses at an 
accelerating rate”.38
With the description of the face, the organization of capitalist representation, thus 
discussed, we should now examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concept o f faciality—the 
function of this organization. Simply put, social machines require the production of faces 
that mirror the dominant face in order to build a regime of signs, defining citizens within 
an apparatus of capture. In a dictatorship, for example, this facialization is obvious since 
there is a “political power operating through the face of the leader (streamers, icons and 
photographs).”39 For example, the ideology of Maoism is borne in the face of Mao which 
is postered all over Tianenman Square. Or in Imperial Rome, to give another example, 
the code of power was demonstrated by the face of Caesar that was stamped on the 
official currency. Fundamentally, however, faciality is not “an affair... of ideology but of 
economy and the organization of power”40 in any given apparatus of capture. The face of 
capitalism is not as literal as the face of the despotic order. For just as the former regime 
does not require an obvious structure of codes, so it does not require an obvious face.
Not only is there a dominant face characterizing an apparatus of capture, but there 
is a faciality machine which is intrinsic to machinic enslavement, and this machine 
“constitutes a facial unit, an elementary face in biunivocal relation with another: it is a
38 ibid., p. 49.
39 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 175.
40 ibid.
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man or a woman, a rich person or a poor one, an adult or a child, a leader or a subject, ‘an 
x or a y’.”41 In other words, the apparatus of capture facializes its citizens on a 
functional level for reasons of social control: the rich person is this face  (the face of the 
“White Man”42?), the poor person is this face  (the face of the vagrant or the immigrant,). 
“You don’t so much as have a face,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “as slide into one.”43 
Your face, your identity, is defined by modes of capitalist representation, and the inner 
depth of your personality is emptied into the one-dimensionality o f socially approved 
hantom objectivity. Once we recognize its nature as an
The university’s faciality machine operates in a similar manner in that the 
insitution represents a facial education in which a faciality is machine contained:
[a] language is always embedded in the faces that announce 
its statements... Choices are guided by faces, elements are 
organized around faces: a common grammar is never 
separable from a facial education.44
The face  of a given university is sometimes evident in items like a Course Calendar: the 
University of Windsor’s course calendar, for example, displays a group of smiling, multi­
ethnic students who appear confident and successful—we are diverse ye t we w ill be 
economically successful.^  But the faciality of a university goes even further; a 
university student is given a specific identity and relation to society due to her education. 
The Computer Science student, for example, will be the “rich person” whereas the
41 ibid., p. 177.
42 ibid., p. 176.
43 ibid., p. 177.
44 ibid., p. 179.
45 I am reminded of a satirical article on The Onion which was entitle “Black Guy Photoshopped 
unto University Calendar”. The article was joking about a university in Illinois that wanted to 
appear politically correct, so it photoshopped a black student unto the calendar’s cover, appearing 
as if this student was interacting with the dominant white students.
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Literature student will be the “poor person” and whether this ultimately proves false or 
not, this is what is implied by the educational institution as demonstrated by a hierarchy 
of funding where the sciences are able to get more grants than the arts. Furthermore, 
grading further defines the student’s identity and, “given a concrete face, the machine 
judges whether it passes or not, whether it goes or not, on the basis of the elementary 
facial units.”46
Faciality becomes a method of control because it produces behaviour in 
accordance with the norms implicit in the face. The student who loves philosophy yet 
gives it up in order to study business is an example of how “the faciality machine... is the 
social production of face”47 because this student eventually slides into the face of the 
profitable businessman because he feels that jobs are more important than ancient 
thinkers. This function is the aspect of machinic enslavement that engenders a politics of 
conformity, for “[a]t every moment, the machine rejects faces that do not conform, or 
seem suspicious.”48 In terms of the university, those who do not follow specific 
guidelines or who attempt something different are punished for their nonconformity, or at 
the very least ostracized by their colleagues. And although the university claims that it is 
a bastion of free thought, the suspicion of the entire socius will occasionally infiltrate the 
educational apparatus. After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre, for 
example, numerous professors, in Canada and the U.S., who made critical comments 
about American foreign policy have been punished “for allegedly anti-American 
statements” and charged with “hate crime”.49 Therefore, the faciality machine of the
46Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 177.
47 ibid., p. 181.
48 ibid., p. 177.
49 Noble, p. 94.
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university tends, as a form of machinic enslavement, to regiment the identity of its 
students within the capitalist regime of signs.
Capitalist space
The functions of discipline discussed by Foucault refer to the regimentation of 
space and time (ie. the enclosure, the control of activity, etc.), and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of faciality explains the regime of signs or the capitalist mode of representation 
which guides these forms of control. Since the face of capitalism lies behind the methods 
of control within the university the very territory of the university exists as capitalist 
space. In other words, it is the shadow of a socius where “[cjapitalist production has 
unified space.”50 Using Debord’s analysis of territory this section of this chapter will 
examine the concept of capitalist space, its existence within the university, and how it 
aids the process of regimental social integration.
With the power of a world wide market ruling as “one vast machine, extending 
over the planet”51, the capitalist commodity has been able to “break down all regional and 
legal barriers” and continues to erode “corporative restrictions”52 in the interest of forging 
a unified, market space. Chapter 11 ofNAFTA, for example, allows corporations to sue 
countries. “This unification,” writes Debord, “is at the same time an extensive and 
intensive process of banalization,,5Z because the market reduces all cultural realities into 
one capitalist reality, one delirium. The concept of a single monolithic capitalist reality 
returns us to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the deterritorialized state—& “worldwide 
axiomatic [which], instead of resulting from heterogeneous social formations and their
50 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 165.
51 Guattari and Negri, p. 7.
52 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 165.
53 ibid.
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relations... determines their relations”54 and appears to eradicate the territories of the 
State. The truth, of course, is that State territories, under capitalism, “are not canceled out 
but change form and take on a new meaning”55, and capitalism becomes the new unified 
territory.
For Guy Debord, though, this unified territory is not merely confined to 
commodity exchange. It is physically evident in the architecture and geography of 
modem society. In other words, territory itse lf is regimented in a capitalist manner, just 
as it was organized and disciplined in other manners in previous State realities. For 
example, “[t]he concern to have open spaces allowing for the rapid circulation of troops 
and the use of artillery against insurrections”56 was the basis for urban construction in 
previous societies (specifally, Hausmann’s reconstruction of Paris). Capitalism, however, 
creates new urban renewal plans and territorial reconstructions in order to allow traffic to 
circulate smoothly in an increasing quantity:
This present abundance of private cars is nothing but the 
result of the constant propaganda by which capitalist 
production persuades the masses... that the possession of a 
car is one of the privileges our society reserves for its 
privileged members.57
Traffic, for Debord, is a paradigm example of capitalist territorial design.
Although there are other capitalist factors behind spatial construction, traffic represents 
the movement of commodities and capital. People purchase vehicles because the 
geography demands it. Roads are provided, vehicles ensure the profit of oil corporations, 
and they circulate their drivers and passengers to stores and jobs—purchasing and
54 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 454.
55 ibid.
56 Debord, “ Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography”, p. 5.
57 ibid.
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producing-in a constant cycle. Traffic is ever present, ensuring a continuous commodity 
exchange. The private vehicle is not merely a means of transportation, it is an “essential 
product of the capitalist market... American economic prosperity is soon going depend 
on the success of the slogan ‘two cars per family’.”58 The profitability of traffic is such 
that cities and universities demolish buildings in order to construct parking lots and 
freeways.
Beyond the notion of traffic is the idea of human circulation. City roads, 
highways, airlines, and institutions like shopping centres exist in order to eliminate 
geographical distance between hubs of production and consumption. One can work at a 
store in the mall and spend money at the food court for lunch. “This society which 
eliminates geographical distance reproduces distance internally as spectacular 
separation.”59 Individuals constantly circulate with other individuals, but there is barely 
any camaraderie: they are separated by their cars, or they are separated by their tasks of 
“frenzied consumption”60.
Able to make “the totality of space into its own setting"^, capitalism can replicate 
its territory in any institution, claiming this institution as its own—as a unified part of the 
socius. Applying these concepts to the university, the spatial arrangement of the 
university is conducive to capitalism. University geography is regimented in order to 
ensure the human circulation of production and consumption: there is a Tim Hortons™ in 
a large number of buildings at UWO, for example, and every university possesses a food 
court. Many possess mini-malls. Between work and class, students circulate from 
consumption centre to consumption centre, and the space has been constructed in order to
58 Debord, “Situationist Theses on Traffic” , p. 56.
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make consumption easier (the disappearance of water fountains so as to encourage drink 
purchasing, for example). Furthermore, roads cut through most university campuses and 
parking lots abound. Cars are encouraged. When you are finished class you can 
conveniently return to your job.
Human circulation within the university, however, has another dimension. There 
is a constant flow of human traffic entering and exiting the gates of university 
registration. Since capitalism has unified all spaces, the exiting student can leave 
university territory in order to smoothly enter professional territory. Both are economic 
territory, and therefore capitalist space. The university is a small city, a shadow of the 
capitalist urban landscape:
The major change to befall universities over the last two 
decades has been the identification of the campus as a 
significant site of capital accumulation, a change in social 
perception that has resulted in the systematic conversion of 
intellectual activity into intellectual capital and, hence, 
intellectual property.62
Moreover, university buildings, as nodes of human circulation, are themselves 
capitalist spaces, that is, sites of production and consumption. “Integration into a 
system,” writes Debord, “requires that isolated individuals be recaptured and isolated 
together”?2 The university building and classrooms are spaces which facilitate machinic 
enslavement. Students, already isolated by spectacular separation (the reproduction of 
geographical distance within themselves) are spaced out and isolated together in seating 
arrangements in order to passively receive a given lecture. This “general movement of 
isolation... must also include a controlled reintegration of [students] depending on the 
needs of production and consumption that can be planned.”64 Thus, if  “the technical
62 Noble, p. 26-27.
63 Debord, Society of the Spectacle, 172.
64 ibid.
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forces of capitalism must be understood as tools for the making of separations,”65 as 
machinic enslavement which regiments individuals as separate cogs, “we are dealing with 
the equipment at the basis of these technical forces”66, in the case of spaces which cause 
spectacular separation.
The forces of capitalist production that exist within university territory are evident 
in corporatized buildings where there is a “transforming of scientific and engineering 
knowledge into commercially viable proprietary products that could be owned and bought 
and sold in the market.”67 This capitalization of knowledge (“the knowledge economy”) 
is physically evident in university territory through the growth of massive computer labs 
built throughout these corporate campus constructions. The labs are regimented sites of 
“the rapid growth in the last few centuries of... [capitalist] technical modes of skill.”68 
Further regimentation becomes evident in the birth of online education where students are 
fully separated from one another by these computers. Capitalist space has become 
cyberspace. “Once faculty and courses go online,” claims David Noble,
“ .. .regimentation, discipline, and even censorship increase dramatically”69 due to the fact 
that the administration will control the course content and eventually be able to reduce 
professors to the same alienation level of the student (as we will see in the following 
section). Debord’s contention has been that territory has been literally reconstructed for 
the cause of the market, thus as the market develops from industrialism to a technological 
post-industrialism, geography does so as well. Capitalist human circulation is becoming
65 ibid., 171.
66 ibid.
67 Noble, p. 27.
68 Dewey, p. 9.
69 Noble, p. 32.
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more effective through online traffic (ie. EBAY, Amazon, etc.) and the automation of 
university education is following this path.
Therefore, the structuring of territory into capitalist space is a form of discipline 
ensuring that the face of capitalism exists within the very geography of the university in 
order to shadow the reality of the socius:
universities tend to mirror the rest of society. Some have 
become big businesses, employing thousands and collecting 
millions in tuition fees... In some cities and towns, the 
resident private university or college is the area’s largest 
landlord, housing students and faculty and, in some 
instances, collecting rents for ordinary or slum dwellings.
With these funds, the universities construct buildings, help 
pay their CEOs (presidents) handsomely, and retain a small 
army of administrators and fundraisers.70
Like the rest of the urban landscape, universities are capitalist spaces. Students are 
caught within these enclosures that serve as “protected place[s] of disciplinary 
monotony,”71 we should add, a disciplinary capitalist monotony which is “the technical 
organization of consumption... which has led the [university] to the point of consuming 
itself.”72
Regimentation accomplished
To conclude this chapter, I want to focus on how the university is consuming itself 
through its regimentation and control over the information and education that is becoming 
more and more evident. Obviously there has been, in the past, a species of disciplines 
distinct in the case of the student: rules of academic rigour, plagiarism guidelines, and
70 Aronowitz, p. 11.
71 Foucault, p. 141.
72 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 171.
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marking standards (for example, a certain number of students have to get an “A”, while 
most have to get a “C”). More importantly, though, is the regimentation of course 
information and regulations that even professors have to obey. The educators themselves 
are being disciplined: “administrators have had to challenge and usurp the faculty’s legal 
right to ownership of the copyright to their course materials—an endeavor which has 
sparked the central battle over the future of academia.”73
In Digital Diploma Mills. David Noble investigates how the coming of the online 
university is allowing this function of discipline to grow. Originally, Noble claims, 
corporate control over education “centered upon the research function of the 
universities.”74 The sciences were funded and commercialized because they were 
beneficial to the overall functioning of the socius.
To make a long story short, universities... [were] 
established as citadels of practical activity: science, of 
course, which helped to produce the much admired atomic 
bomb; engineering which dug tunnels under Gibraltar to 
keep the Germans at bay; economics, which produced 
Canada’s centralized tax system.75
Indeed, this funding of research upheld Dewey’s pragmatic view of education by 
attaching university information to social practicality. “It is not difficult,” writes Stanley 
Aronowitz, “to discern the debt of this educational philosophy to John Dewey’s 
pragmatism... [because] a good education tends to be construed within a framework of 
instrumental rationality and formalism.”76 Therefore, the funding of research ensures the 
control of information as an instrument of the apparatus of capture.
73 Noble, p. 37.
74 ibid.
75 Bercuson, Bothweil, and Granastein, p. 13.
76 Aronowitz, p. 136.
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With the coming of the online university, however, the capitalist control over 
information has grown beyond research funding and has begun to determine educational 
instruction itself. Just as the commercialization of research had transformed specific 
information into an exchangeable commodity, the online automation of higher education 
allows for “the instructional process, classroom teaching, [to be] converted into products, 
such as CD-ROM’s, websites, or courseware.”77 In the previous section I discussed how 
this shift produces a new geography, a capitalist cyberspace; and as a capitalist space it 
allows for a corporate control of information. Such a space is one where courses are 
controlled as “marketable commodities by means of copyrights and licenses to distribute 
copyrighted instructional processes.”78
Thus, copyright control becomes extremely important. The university 
administration needs to usurp the ownership of the faculty “in order to capitalize on the 
online instruction marketplace”79 and, in turn, work this faculty as “mere producers of 
marketable instructional commodities that they may or may not themselves ‘deliver’ .”80 
The battle for copyright control, Noble notes, began in the mid-90s when numerous North 
American institutions entered into business agreements with private firms (ie. Berkeley 
and American Online) concerning educational commercialization81 which revealed that 
such a control was important. In all of these agreements “the university has explicitly 
assumed its own, rather than faculty, authorship/ownership of course materials.”82
77 Noble, p. 38.
78 ibid.
79 ibid., p. 39.
80 ibid., p. 38.
81 ibid., p. 39.
82 ibid.
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The corporate control over intellectual property allows the university apparatus to 
stamp the face of capitalism onto all of its courseware. By assuming 
authorship/ownership the administration can make whatever deal it wishes, with 
whomever it wishes, and thus profit on lucrative deals. The faculty, ousted from their 
traditional role, have become subject to a faciality machine: they are told to either become 
part of this corporate informational process or lose their jobs. Although the faculty can 
resist, the choice of resistance is never presented to them by the administration. Since the 
professoriate is already defined by the administration, they can either continue 
representing the administrative interests in the new regime or risk dismissal. A cog in the 
apparatus can always be replaced.
This regimentation of information, then, permits a systematic control over the 
university institution. The control of faculty courseware allows the administration to 
control its teachers and, therefore, its students. Returning to Foucault’s idea of discipline 
being a composition o f forces, the university reveals itself as “a machine whose effect 
will be maximized by the concerted articulation of the elementary parts of which it is 
composed.”83 The control of intellectual property is a regime of signs: information has a 
specific commodity function, faculty must teach it as such, and students will learn it as 
such. In other words, once curricula are controlled by the administration, such curricula 
will be tailored to fit the administration’s goal of an economically lucrative institution. In 
order to fit in with this administrative dream, educators are now forced to “confront the 
harsh realities of capitalist production: speedup, routinization of work, greater work 
discipline and managerial supervision, reduced autonomy, job insecurity, employer 
appropriation of the fruits of their labor, and, above all, the insistent managerial pressures 
to reduce labor costs in order to turn a profit.”84
83 Foucault, p. 164.
84 Noble, p. 4.
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Machinic enslavement is evident in the push for online education because, as 
aforementioned, as soon as “faculty and courses go online, administrators gain much 
greater direct control over faculty performance and course content than ever before”85, 
and all forms of discipline will “increase dramatically.”86 Furthermore, the university 
will come to resemble, even more, the world of alienated labour as work hours, for both 
student and faculty, become scheduled and disciplined to a greater degree. The faculty’s 
academic knowledge, transformed into an instrumental commodity, becomes part of the 
apparatus’ machinery and allows for the faculty itself to sink to a commodity level: “[t]he 
administration is now in a position to hire less skilled, and hence cheaper, workers to 
deliver the technologically pre-packaged course.”87
Although Noble notes that this online restructuring of university territory is not in 
full bloom, due to student and faculty protest, he holds that it is growing at a rapid pace. 
Already, the university administration has begun to control educational information, and 
it is only a matter of time before it requires “faculty to assign all copyrights on course 
material to the university as a condition of employment”.88 When the information is thus 
controlled, the entire educational process will become completely regimented.
Conclusion
A disciplinary institution which promulgates a regime of signs, structures and 
controls its territory, and regiments the educational information is ultimately a machine, 
or an apparatus of capture. The regimentation that is affected by capitalism is machinic 
enslavement because the entire institution subjects itself to the machine of capitalism,
85 ibid., p. 32.
86 ibid.
87 ibid.
88 ibid., p. 40.
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producing “an unrivaled slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer even 
any masters, but only slaves commanding others slaves... for the social machine.”89 
Even the bounded freedom of academia, which allows for the production of social 
criticism, is slowly being eroded. The birth of a new capitalist space, an online space, 
does not allow for criticism because it only allows for instrumental education.
With capitalist regimentation pervading every aspect of the university system one 
can almost claim that schools do not merely, as Foucault wrote, resemble prisons. “There 
is no metaphor here... they do not resemble prisons, they are prisons.”90 Such prisons, 
although systems of regimentation, are merely reified arrangements of social relations 
which, as such, may be ultimately changed.
89 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 254.
90 ibid., p. 374.
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CHAPTER THREE
the educational model
“The system needs its servants, each birth is one more 
They’ll gently talk o f freedom as they quietly lock the door 
‘Cos the system needs its servants i f  the system’s gonna run 
Needs its fodder for the workhouse, its targets for the gun.”
Crass, “Reality Whitewash ”
Introduction
In the preceding chapter the capitalist modes of regimentation were investigated in 
order to demonstrate how students are controlled and ultimately integrated into the socius. 
There is a problem, however, in conceiving of the university institution as a vast machinic 
prison. As aforementioned, the university setting is also a place where a measure of 
freedom is allowed. It is a place in which critical texts are produced and, oft-times, 
critical thinking is encouraged. If the university were simply a functional machine, as the 
previous chapter suggests, then even this freedom that demonstrably exists would be 
inexplicable. This tension in the argument will need to be resolved.
As was discussed at the outset of this paper, the university is a contradictory 
institution which allows a measure of critical freedom as long as this freedom stays 
bounded inside the gates of academia. It is this contradiction which makes the control 
and regimentation, discussed in the last chapter, make sense. The aim of this 
regimentation is economic and social integration, and a certain amount of freedom is 
permitted as long as it does not interfere with this final goal. In this regard, such a 
freedom mirrors liberal society in general, reflecting Mill’s ideas about freedom in On 
Liberty. As Mill writes, “[a]n opinion that com dealers are starvers of the poor, or that 
private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the 
press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob
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assembled before the house of a com dealer”.1 In other words, a measure of freedom is 
permitted as long as it remains in the abstract, but as soon as it interferes with the status 
quo—where an angry mob is incited to rebel—then such freedom becomes impermissible.
Yet there are often individuals who are able to escape the complete effects of the 
university apparatus’ control of the status quo. They may become social critics or 
conscientious protesters. These individuals, however, still have to deal with “one vast 
machine, extending over the planet an enslavement of all mankind.”2 Although such a 
machine may ultimately be overcome, at present the delirium it constructs spreads across 
the entire globe. This delirium is supported, in part, by an academic institution that 
impedes critical freedom from passing beyond university gates.
That the above contradiction exists is due to the educational model of knowledge 
that the university promotes, a model evident, as we have seen, in the pragmatic 
philosophy of Dewey. In this chapter, then, this model of knowledge will be examined. 
We will focus on Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of “knowledge capital”, Freire’s “banking 
model” of education, and the book Petrified Campus’ development of Laidler’s idea of 
human capital. Finally, I will investigate the educational model in light of Herman and 
Chomsky’s “propaganda model”.
Knowledge capital
In the previous chapter, the capitalist system of representation was examined and 
understood as a “technical means of expression”3 where information is “adapted to 
money as the general equivalent”.4 Or, as Dyer-Witheford writes in Cyber-Marx,
1 Mill, p. 1206.
2 Guattari and Negri, p. 7.
3 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 240.
4 ibid.
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“information... has become an indispensable ingredient in a massive reorganization of 
advanced capitalist societies [which are now] centred on the introduction of new 
technologies.”5 The capitalist sign, then, is that of capital and all other forms of 
representation must fall under this order. Therefore, the study and pursuit of any kind of 
knowledge should be understood as knowledge capital. This section will investigate 
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of knowledge capital and its roots in the liberal educational 
philosophy of John Dewey.
According to Deleuze and Guattari nothing has value, in a capitalist society, 
unless it is considered in terms of its overall “profitability... in its relationships with the 
market and with commercial and financial capital.”6 In a capitalist society, the 
production of textiles, for example, is not judged valuable because it is a need or is 
attractive, but on the profitability of the textile commodity: how many units can be sold 
and exchanged on the world market, and how much profit can be generated. Likewise, 
the production of knowledge is a commodity which bears some similarity to something as 
mundane as textiles. In terms of scientific knowledge, for instance, “the introduction of 
innovations always tends to be delayed beyond the time scientifically necessary, until the 
moment when the market forecasts justify their exploitation on a large scale.”7 Although 
pure research may be permitted, it is always justified and funded in terms of technical and 
economic payoffs in the future. Alternate versions of the gas-driven car, for example, 
have been envisioned and invented—a sugar car, an electric car—but have been ultimately 
shelved because the market is not finished with oil.
Scientific knowledge, however, is just one aspect of these capitalised codes of 
information. “Knowledge, information, and... education,” write Deleuze and Guattari,
5 Dyer-Witheford, p. 37.
6Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
7 ibid.
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“are just as much parts of capital (‘knowledge capital’) as is the most elementary labor of 
the worker.”8 Although knowledge, information and education possess a history which 
precedes the capitalist socius, they can be commodified along with everything else:
The tendency of capitalism is to substitute for fixed and 
limiting relations between men and things an abstract unit 
of equivalence that allows the free exchange, and aleatory 
substitution, of everything for everything. Not only are 
equivalences established between goods in an open market, 
but bodies, actions, ideas, knowledge, fantasies, images 
function as commodities which can be translated into other 
commodities.9
Everything is ultimately exploitable by the delirium of capitalism.
I am not suggesting, however, that the knowledge learned in an educational setting 
is simply capitalistic. One may learn many things which are either anti-capitalist (forms 
of critical theory and modes of thought which enable one to break free of socially 
sanctioned thought forms) or pre-capitalist. In the former case, however, I refer back to 
the first chapter where, in the section concerning Debord, I discussed the capitalist 
appropriation of revolutionary theory. By transforming revolutionary theories into 
separated schools of thought, social criticism becomes stratified—he’s a Marxist Idealist 
while she’s a Marxist Realist. And the latter case (studies of a pre-capitalist nature) is 
viewed as an educational archaism which can still be attached to the capitalist order:
the [pre-capitalist] flows of code... are subjected to a 
properly social axiomatic that is much severer... than all the 
old codes and overcodes that have disappeared: the 
axiomatic of the world capitalist market. In brief, the flows 
of code that are ‘liberated’ [from previous social orders] by 
the capitalist regime engender a machinic surplus value that
8 ibid.
9 Bogue, p. 100.
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does not directly depend on [knowledge itself], but on 
capital.10
In other words, although the university system may teach social criticism and an historical 
tradition, as a capitalist apparatus of capture the ultimate end of this knowledge is profit. 
Even though studying Greek philosophy or Middle English may not be “profititable” in 
and of themselves, they can be taught as anticipating capital-as outdated studies that are 
worthy to be learned for traditional reasons, and that are now irrelevant due to the new 
social order. And these faculties become underfunded since they are not as profitable as, 
for example, economics. Such a profitability is evident in the birth of the online 
universities as discussed by Noble and examined in the previous chapter. The university 
space has become a factory that produces commodified knowledge, where “the buying 
and selling of commodities takes on the appearance of education”.11 Furthermore, online 
universities are only focused on programs that possess “immediate benefit to the 
corporate sector.”12 Thus, they specialize in programs such as computer science, 
economics, or business.
Just as the university is a contradictory institution, composed by the forces of free 
thought and social integration, so too is the concept of “knowledge capital”. Knowledge 
implies freedom of thought, the quest of philosophers, the sun in Plato’s cave allegory 
and, for the ancients, the pursuit of truth. Capital, on the other hand, implies the pursuit 
of profit, the love of money and wealth which, for philosophers like Plato and Aristotle13 
, was pathological (see Republic Bk. 1 and the discussion with Thrasymachus14) and may
10 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 234.
11 Noble, p. 4.
12 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
13 although not for the Hedonists.
14 Plato 343b-344c
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interfere with the quest for knowledge. True knowledge for Plato, for example, is not 
connected with crude pleasures such as wealth but with a transcendent “good” which is 
“the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their 
being and reality.”15 The concept of knowledge capital, then, may produce information 
which many ancient philosophers would never approve of—a “stupidity in the midst of 
knowledge and science”16 which allows “apolitico-military-economic complex... [to 
engender] for its own part an enormous machinic surplus value by mobilizing the 
resources of knowledge and information capital.”17 Therefore, what one learns at 
university may also be appropriated by the capitalist machine to serve the cause of the 
socius: business skills, scientific weaponry, and apologetics for the state.
Since in the midst of the university’s critical world of academics knowledge 
capital spawns a “stupidity”, it is easy to ignore and overlook the critical freedom this 
institution also possesses. This “stupidity” is evident in student actions which have long 
become pop-cultural stereotypes: keg parties, fraternity shenanigans, amusing clubs, 
fashion cliques, and all of the distracting social escapades which have formed the subjects 
for many movies and sitcoms that claim that this is what university is about. And this 
“stupidity” becomes further evident when its practitioners cut their classes—because they 
stayed up late partying—and end up “cramming” to achieve a passing grade. Such a 
“stupidity”, created by the alienation of the student, allows for the propagation of 
knowledge capital.
Capitalism, according to Deleuze and Guattari, following Marx, is defined by the 
contradictory forces of production and anti-production. In other words, the capitalist 
socius, which tends to overproduce, needs to destroy its forces of production and products
15 ibid., 509b
16 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 236.
17 ibid., p. 235.
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in order to keep on producing: “the capitalist effusion is that of antiproduction within 
production at all levels of the process... to produce lack... where there is always too 
much”18 (thus producing demand for supply). The “stupidity” found in the midst of 
knowledge mimics this goal of capitalism. The force of antiproduction is realized as “an 
equivalent flow of stupidity that also effects an absorption and a realization, and that 
ensures the integration of groups and individuals into the system.”19 Thus we now have 
four contradictions which mirror and imitate one another: production and antiproduction, 
knowledge and stupidity, knowledge and capital, and critical freedom and social 
integration. The last of these contradictions is what defines the university and perhaps 
this contradiction only exists because capitalism itse lf is contradictory.
Therefore it would be a mistake to construe John Dewey’s educational 
philosophy, and all of its analogues, as the force which constructed the academic 
contradiction of critical freedom and social integration. Dewey merely described and 
helped implement the contradiction contained in the notion of knowledge capital. The 
institution of the university, previous to Dewey’s philosophy, had imitated the despotic 
order. It was an ivory tower which courted the societal elite. Out of a liberal humanism, 
Dewey believed that education needed to satisfy the needs of the modem “man” and not 
the “citizen” of an archaic order20, and therefore must imitate “the industrial revolution, 
and the development of democracy.”21
The focus on the man of modernity rather than the archaic citizen is a product of 
what Deleuze and Guattari call deterritorialization, where the market appears to override 
the State and the modem man appears to replace the citizen. But the market becomes the
18 ibid., p. 235.
19 ibid., p. 235-236.
20 Dewey, p. 93.
21 ibid., p. 331.
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new State-the detenitorialized Capitalist State—and the modem man becomes the new 
citizen, the citizen of global capitalism. Since Dewey was writing during the days of 
early industrialism, when capitalism was becoming the dominant reality, his apparent 
humanitarian construct of “man” is simply the capitalist citizen.
Finally, Dewey’s desire for education to develop along with “the rapid growth in 
the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill”22 is the starting point 
for an educational model of knowledge capital. The student, for Dewey, is to be nurtured 
and fostered in order to be socially profitable. The goal of his liberal model is “social 
efficiency... [and] industrial competency”.23 The concept of knowledge capital, after all, 
implies that knowledge is attached to the interests of the economy, and Dewey’s 
philosophy does not deny this association. He says explicitly that the “result ability [of 
education is] to make one’s way economically in the world and to manage economic 
resources usefully” 24
The shape of knowledge capital, described and implemented by Dewey’s 
philosophical influence, is the educational model which mimics the modem socius (a 
social order defined by the market). But the market, the dominant feature of the socius, is 
merely a human invention that has been, according to Lukacs, reified and thus given a 
phantom objectivity. The liberal model of education, then, may also possess such a 
phantom objectivity. Once we recognize its nature as an arrangement of social relations 
we may be able to change its face.
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Banking education
The educational model of knowledge capital propagates itself through the 
mediation of a faculty whose task is to “nurture” and “foster” the student. As 
aforementioned, university professors—although sinking, themselves, to the level of a 
commodity—participate in the alienation of the student by allowing the capitalist 
academic discourse to proceed from their podiums. This is not to say that professors are 
simply instruments o f the apparatus of capture (because there are numerous radical 
educators). Rather, teachers are part of the fostering of knowledge capital. Although 
professors face alienation themselves (ie. the coming of the online university), they are 
the bottom managment25 of the educational factory; they are oppressed by the factory’s 
rules, but they manage the oppression of the labourers below them, the students. Paulo 
Freire refers to this fostering of knowledge capital as the banking concept of education, 
and this section will outline this concept as preparation for the positive appropriation of 
Freire’s critical pedagogy in the next chapter.
“Education thus becomes an act of depositing,” writes Freire, “in which the 
students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor... This is the ‘banking’ 
concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as 
far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits.”26 We have observed that Dewey’s 
philosophy reveals this educational attitude insofar as he conceives of the teaching 
process as “a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating process.”27 As Freire rightly points out, 
this oft-times patronizing approach leads to an alienation between the student and her
25 A manager I once had at one of my student jobs was a perfect example of bottom 
management. In many ways he was like the workers he managed-overworked, frustrated, 
subject to the authority of upper management-but, when push came to shove, he would still show 
us who was boss.
26 Freire, p. 53.
27 Dewey, p. 10.
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education since her education has been reduced to deposits which just need to be stored— 
she only needs to memorize certain facts in order to pass her course. For, “in the last 
analysis, it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, 
transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system.”28
Therefore, the banking concept creates another educational contradiction—a 
“teacher-student contradiction”29—which “negates education and knowledge as process of 
inquiry.”30 According to Freire, real education should be a holistic process in which both 
the teacher and the student are engaged in a continuous process of inquiry. The banking 
method of education, however, sets up the learning process as an oppressive pedagogy 
and opposes the teacher to the student:
Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a 
characteristic of the ideology of oppression... [t]he teacher 
presents himself to his students as the necessary opposite; 
by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own 
existence.31
The teacher-student contradiction, maintained by the banking concept of 
education, is evident in a number of attitudes:
a) the teacher teaches and the students are taught;
b) the teacher knows everything and the students know 
nothing;
c) the teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
d) the teacher talks and the students listen—meekly.32




32 ibid., p. 54.
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The paradigmatic university classroom is characterized by a professor lecturing from 
behind a podium to ranked and filed students busily copying down the words which issue 
from his mouth. This is not to say that students are not allowed to question the lecture, 
but the questioning takes place on the professor’s own terms: hands should be raised, or a 
designated question and answer period is allowed at the end of the class. But the 
contradiction goes further...
e) the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;
f) the teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the 
students comply;
g) the teacher acts and the students have the illusion of 
acting through the action of the teacher;
h) the teacher chooses the program content, and the students 
(who were not consulted) adapt to it.33
The university, as discussed in the previous chapter, is a disciplinary institution, and the 
professor, to some extent at least, is an instrument of this discipline. The examination, 
for example, is a form of discipline which is chosen by the professor to reflect his chosen 
program content and “makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish.”34 The final 
result is that
i) the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his 
or her own professional authority, which she and he sets 
in opposition to the freedom of the students;
j) the teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while 
the pupils are mere objects.35
Students have been alienated and reduced to receptacles that are processed through the 
university institution, classroom by classroom, until they are ready to leave. Their grade
33 ibid.
34 Foucault, p. 184.
35 Freire, p. 54.
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point average is the end result of their professors’ authoritative teaching and marking.
This is not to say that there are no such thing as bad students, but the “stupidity” of 
students (discussed in the previous section) is partly due to the contradiction inherent to 
knowledge capital. The teacher-student contradiction fosters this “stupidity” by opposing 
the professor to the student so that many students do not wish to truly learn, but only do 
enough to pass the course. If this contradiction were resolved the “bad students” may 
slowly disappear from classrooms.
The aforementioned attitudes intrinsic to the banking model of education regard 
“men as adaptable, manageable beings.”36 The manageable student may be integrated 
into the socius by the university apparatus of capture and, having been managed and 
fostered, will be able “to make one’s way economically in the world and ... manage 
economic resources usefully”.37 Banking education, which propagates the teacher- 
student contradiction, also propagates the contradiction with which this paper is mainly 
concerned: the contradiction between critical freedom and social integration. The student 
may be taught critical skills and allowed a measure of freedom, but the banking method 
renders her manageable and controllable:
The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to 
them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which 
would result from their intervention in the world as 
transformers of that world. The more completely they 
accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend 
simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented 
view of reality deposited on them.38
This “fragmented view of reality” is the face of the socius which is stamped onto the 
university apparatus of capture: the capitalist delirium.
36 ibid.
37 Dewey, p. 119.
38 Freire, p. 54.
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The contradiction between critical freedom and social integration becomes more 
evident when one understands that the interests of banking education lie in ‘“changing the 
consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them’; for the more the 
oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.”39 
Students may be taught to critically engage with a text, or even critically examine social 
structures, but such skills are bound to the world of the university: the critical analysis of 
society becomes, at the end of the day, just another text to be deposited in the 
consciousness of the student. The student’s consciousness, after all, is to be nurtured and 
fostered in the direction of social efficiency. The transformation of the world outside of 
the university gates is not in the interests of this efficiency. Dewey’s liberal 
“humanitarian” philosophy of education, then, is not interested in having “the world 
revealed nor to see it transformed”40; it is interested in “presenting] a profitable 
situation.”41
Moreover, the banking concept veils the interdependence of humanity by 
assuming a dichotomy between the teacher and student, and “a dichotomy between 
human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with 
others; the individual is spectator not recreator.”42 The veiling of humanity’s essential 
interdependence has always been propagated by capitalism, and the banking method of 
teaching echoes this task. The solution, then, is to conceive of education as a mutual 
process between teacher and student, and “not to ‘integrate’ them into the structure of
39 ibid., p. 55.
40 ibid., p. 54.
41 ibid.
42 ibid., p. 56.
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oppression [which creates the teacher-student contradiction], but to transform that 
structure”.43 I will propose a strategy for such a transition in the final chapter.
The liberal model revisited
Before moving on to a discussion of a critical pedagogy, I want to examine an 
example of current liberal approaches to education which hide the problems analyzed by 
Freire. “The concept of human capital,” writes Laidler, one of these new liberal 
education reformers, “has been central to the economic analysis of education for about 40 
years.”44 Just as Dewey perceived of education as something which served the modem 
economy, current liberal educators define university education as a knowledge economy 
with the student as the smallest unit. The student as human capital is a concept which, 
through the doctrine of postindustrialism, incorporates both the concepts of knowledge 
capital and banking education. The student unit is a commodity that has been invested in 
by the factory which produced it (the university) and may, in turn, capitalize on its 
knowledge by taking its education “to market and offering] it for sale as a commodity”.45
Three of the contributors to the Laidler study—David Bercuson, Robert Bothwell, 
and J.L. Granatstein—have written a book called Petrified Campus: the Crisis of Canada’s 
Universities, that discusses and defends this modem liberal view on education. What is 
interesting about this book is that it seems to directly invoke the old liberal model of 
education and thus reveals the educational contradiction with which this paper is 
concerned. This section of the chapter will investigate the philosophy of this book and 
the educational model that guides the modem university.
43 ibid., p. 55.
44 Laidler, p. 8.
45 ibid.
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Bercuson and his fellow authors cast themselves as modem Deweys who are 
continuing the liberal reform of the old ivory tower. Indeed, their goals seem 
enlightened:
If universities are to teach students how to think, how to use 
their brains, rather than to cram facts into them, then 
universities must also be places of free inquiry. Free 
inquiry is the simple freedom of professors and students to 
seek after knowledge, truth, beauty, even ugliness, wherever 
they believe they may find it.46
So far, so good. Such an aim seems idealistic and, phrased as such, should be defended. 
Everyone should support “free inquiry”, after all, is this not what this very paper is about? 
But Bercuson and his fellow authors go on to write that “[tjhere are always limits on any 
freedom,”47 and their book is designed to show just what these limits are and, further, 
what the aim of this freedom should be in actuality.
Although the authors begin by defending free inquiry, they limit this freedom by 
claiming that “[sjtudents [have] too much say in determining strictly academic matters”.48 
In other words, the democratization of education is primarily a good thing, but “[t]oo 
much democracy [has] crept into the university governance.”49 What the authors are 
referring to as too much democracy are policies like student unions and entrance equity, 
and they believe that universities have “become instruments of public policy rather than 
institutions of learning.”50 While I agree that universities have become instruments of 
public policy; it is not a democratic policy, but a capitalist policy of integration that
46 Bercuson, et al., p. 2.
47 ibid.
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determines them. This capitalist policy is not reflected in the bounded academic freedom 
the authors are complaining about (I believe that this freedom is a good thing and should 
extend beyond the university); but it is reflected in their very philosophy.
Bercuson and his fellow authors reveal their educational ideology when they hold 
up American and British universities as the model that Canadian universities must strive 
to imitate. “The university has always been the training ground [for industry],”51 the 
authors claim, but it started to fall short of the American and British standard when 
Canadian university accessibility was made easier.52 The issue of accessibility, though, is 
not something I want to engage with at this point. Rather, I want to point out the authors’ 
driving argument: the university is a training ground for economic integration, and 
freedoms such as “accessibility” interfere with this goal because students are admitted 
who do not care if  there is a “job at the end of university”.53 Moreover, students who are 
unqualified, according to the authors, are admitted, thus denying the market the benefit of 
“the brightest in society”.54 The philosophy of banking education should be evident at 
this point; university, for the authors, is a place where the captured students are invested 
in, and therefore must be among those who can return this investment in the job market.55
51 ibid., p. 45.
52 ibid., p. 49.
53 ibid., p. 48.
54 ibid.
55 As a side note, the authors lament that “qualified white males” (Bercuson, p. 48) are denied access in 
the interests o f minority groups which may have “important qualifications stemming from [a] different 
perspective.” (ibid.) Bercuson and his fellow writers claim that this kind o f admission logic is unfair to the 
poor white male who is better qualified to take his place in society. The philosophy o f economic integration 
is evident in this regard as well since the face  o f the market is that “of modem White Man, the semiotic of 
capitalism”. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 182)
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Furthermore, the authors refer to the university in terms of a factory, taking it for 
granted that this is an accepted fact: “Canada’s universities—indeed, those of much of the 
world—face... major challenges today: how to reach more ‘customers’; how to ensure that 
universities continue to ‘add value’ to their product”.56 Bercuson and his friends go on 
to claim that the universities are falling short of this goal since they are not fully 
embracing the new economic reality (as Dewey had claimed as well) which is “a growing 
demand for off-campus education, a demand that cannot be ignored.”57 In other words, 
the authors are supporters of the online university which has been criticized by David 
Noble and discussed, at length, in the last chapter. Online universities, for Bercuson and 
the others, are the solution to the above problem—the way in which the university can 
“continue to ‘add value’ to their product”, and the universities must “learn to adapt to 
new times.”58 (Sounding familiar?) The knowledge economy must, according to the 
doctrine of the “information revolution”, develop alongside the market economy.
While appearing to claim that universities are behind the times, all the Bercuson 
crew is doing is describing the university’s current function. Their guiding philosophy 
admits that the university is a knowledge economy and that the student is human capital— 
a “product”. Even when they claim that many students “drift along, boring themselves”59 
all they are doing is unwittingly describing the “stupidity” in the midst of knowledge 
which is the central contradiction of knowledge capital. Therefore, what they see as 
primarily flawed about the university—students who do not provide a return on 
investment—is actually part of the model they support: capitalism’s contradictory forces 
of production and anti-production. Moreover, what the authors demand—adaptation to a
56 Bercuson, et al., p. 84.
57 ibid., p. 88.
58 ibid., p. 89.
59 ibid., p. 48.
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changing market—is already the direction in which the university is moving; Noble’s book 
discusses this fact in great detail. Noble’s position, as aforementioned, is that the 
university system is already adapting to the realities of the capitalist market; online 
education being the prime example of how university courses have become “marketable 
instructional commodities”.60 The liberal model of education is still alive and 
functioning, even if  it is not adapting as fast as Bercuson and the other authors of 
Petrified Campus would like. And it is inaccurate to describe it as a “liberal model”; it is 
a capitalist model disguised as humanitarian.
I am not claiming that Bercuson and his fellow writers are intentionally disguising 
their concerns with human capital behind humanitarian considerations; like Dewey before 
them, they sincerely believe they are possessed by humanitarian concerns. In the interests 
of “free inquiry” they still support a critical academic freedom: “[universities must 
remain among the very few places on earth where the unconventional, the uncomfortable, 
the once unmentionable can be pursued in both teaching and research.”61 Indeed, the 
authors defend the freedom of knowledge; they do so, however, with the philosophy that 
the university is “an open and free marketplace”62 and this is the problem with their 
viewpoint. That “freedom” can only exist within a bounded institution that promotes 
economic integration is absurd. Such a view of freedom is limiting and socially bankrupt; 
it is the freedom of a dusty library shelf and not society. Freedom should not be 
relegated to “very few places on earth” but should flow over all places on earth. Thus 
Bercuson and the others are merely describing and recasting the contradiction with which 
this paper is concerned: critical freedom versus social integration. Despite the authors’ 
humanitarian concerns, it is ultimately the market that matters, and the university is cast
60 Noble, p. 38.
61 Bercuson, et al., p. 204.
62 ibid.
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as an institution that must, first and foremost, mirror the economic reality of society—the 
social delirium. The Bercuson crew, then, are merely wolves in sheeps’ clothing without 
even realizing it.
Propaganda Model
In this chapter a number ofbasic claims have been made concerning the current 
model of education. Broadly speaking, university education was described as 
“knowledge capital” in which the free pursuit of knowledge is bounded by the interests of 
capital. This binding conflicts the liberal definition of education as a free pursuit of 
interest. Education, then, functions directly upon the student as “banking education”. An 
authoritarian structure is established that veils the mutual relation of the educator and the 
educated by forcing knowledge to flow through a “teacher-student contradiction”. 
Moreover, this contradictory approach to education, which opposes critical freedom to 
social integration, is evident in the philosophy of Dewey’s intellectual heirs who claim to 
be university reformers. The fact that this educational contradiction continues to exist is 
because the capitalist model of education is a kind of “propaganda model”.
In this section of this chapter I will compare the university system of education to 
Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s “propaganda model” of the media. Obviously 
this comparison is only meant to be an analogy that will hopefully illuminate the issues 
discussed in this chapter. As with all analogies there are numerous limitations: Herman 
and Chomsky’s research, for instance, is directed at the mass media and so their empirical 
research does not inform my specific approach. Furthermore, not all models are fully 
translatable. Thus, it would be false to assume that everything they say about the media 
holds true for education as well. But it is not my intention to build an entire paper out of 
this propaganda model; it is only meant as a useful analogy that will elucidate the 
concepts contained in this chapter. Therefore, just as I compared the university student to
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Marx’s alienated nineteenth century factory worker, I will compare the university model 
of education with a media model of propaganda.
The basis of this comparison between the university and the media is:
The mass media serve as a system for communicating 
messages and symbols to the general populace. It is their 
function to amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate 
individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behaviour 
that will integrate them into the institutional structures of 
the larger society.63
We can see clearly how this model makes sense in the context of the arguments 
developed in this and the first two chapters. As was discussed in the first chapter, in 
regards to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “apparatus of capture”, the “supreme 
task” of any State institution is to integrate individuals into “a global system of desire and 
destiny that organizes the productions of production... and the productions of 
consumption.”64 This concept was expanded in the second chapter which was devoted to 
the university regimentation of the student—the “chum[ing] out [of] the trained personnel 
that is so essential for bureaucratic capitalism.”65 One of the ways in which this 
disciplined training is accomplished is through a regime o f signs66—a capitalist order of 
representation which, like mass media, “inculcate[s] individuals with the values, beliefs 
and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the 
larger society.”
Furthermore, the mass media is a spectacle, and thus another aspect of Debord’s 
“spectacular society” of which the university’s placement has already been discussed.
63 Herman and Chomsky, p. 1.
64 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 142.
65 Cohn-Bendit, p. 41.
66 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 111.
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The media, for Debord, is one disseminator of “image-obj ects” which affects social 
separation67, but “[e] very thing that was directly lived has moved away into 
representation’ ’68—the university along with the media. As was already investigated in 
this chapter’s section on knowledge capital, there is a “stupidity” evident amongst 
students which has become a pop-cultural representation in movies and sitcoms. 
Spectacular society is the whole of society because institutions such as the media and the 
university present life as an “immense accumulation of spectacles”̂  in which the 
dominant capitalist ideology has “transformed, and polluted, [the world] according to the 
means and interests of modem industry.”70
Using Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model as an analogy, then, we should 
be able trace “the routes by which money and power are able to filter out... [and] 
marginalize dissent,”71 allowing the model of education to remain in line with the 
interests of a capitalistic state. This model possesses five “filters” which describe how it 
functions: the size, advertising, experts, flak, and anticommunism.72 Since Manufacturing 
Consent was written during the end of the coldwar the last filter was specifically referring 
to anti-Soviet sentiment evident in the media; thus I am choosing to interpret it, instead, 
as procapitalism.
67 see Chapter One, and the section concerning Spectacular Society.
68 Debord, Society o f the Spectacle, 1, emphasis added.
69 ibid.
70 Debord, Comments on the Society o f the Spectacle, p. 10.
71 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
72 ibid.
73 One could also, now, substitute anti-Islam for anticommunism.
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The first filter, the size, refers to the “concentrated ownership, owner wealth, and 
profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms”.74 The authors are referring to the 
idea of media moguls who own sizable portions of the media industry. Such moguls are 
individuals like Israel Asper who controls a large percentage of Canadian media (Global 
Canwest, The Star, The National Post) and, therefore, holds a lot of power over 
information—power, for example, to fire columnists who do not fall in line with his own 
political agenda. University size and ownership are obviously different; there are no 
nameable educational mogols. But although the Asper of the university world might not 
exist, as universities grow in size they fall increasingly into the realm of corporate 
ownership, as authors like Stanley Aronowitz and David Noble attest to—a realm where 
Berkeley, for example, can enter into a partnership with American Online.75 Thus, even 
though a single controlling figure may not be evident, there is still “concentrated 
ownership” since “the university has explicitly assumed its own, rather than faculty, 
authorship/ownership of course materials.”76
Advertising is, according to Herman and Chomsky, “the primary income source of 
the mass media”77, and therefore the media must reflect the interests of its advertisers if it 
desires to keep its funding. One of the issues discussed in the last chapter of this paper 
was the commercialization of education; Noble claims that the birth of the online 
university is due, in part, to commercial interests: a new territory—a cyberspace—can be 
constructed in which electronic advertising will be ever present (pop-ups, banners, etc.). 
Before the beginning of the online university, however, advertising played a role in the 
educational process. University territory has already been funded by corporations,
74 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
75 Noble, p. 39.
76 ibid.
77 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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transforming the campus into a capitalist space where advertising is ever present—from 
the university buildings, to the calendars, to the urinals in the bathrooms. Although this 
widespread advertising may seem as nothing more than an annoying optical toxin, the 
reality is that it does influence aspects of the educational process. In the sciences, for 
example, there is corporate funding “for all types of scientific research [in order to 
produce] commercially oriented molecular biology applications, chiefly for agricultural 
and drug corporations.”78 Moreover the university has also been involved in military 
research, as Bercuson and his fellow authors admit: “[university] science helped to 
produce the much admired atomic bomb; engineering [helped engineer the] tunnels under 
Gibraltar to keep the Germans at bay”.79 Obviously the funding of this kind of research 
is a form of advertising insofar as the research advertises for the company that funded it; 
studies that are taught in science take on the partial identity of an advertisement.
The third filter of the propaganda model is “the reliance of the media on 
information provided by government, business, and 'experts' funded and approved by 
these primary sources and agents of power.”80 For Herman and Chomsky this filter is 
meant to analyze the flow of news information from the Pentagon and “the corporate 
sector”81 to the sites of media production where information is homogenized and, 
furthermore, nominate and control the “expert” voices. With this filter there is a direct 
intersection with the university; the mass media partially recruits its “needed body of 
experts” from academia:
The process of creating the needed body of experts has 
been carried out on a deliberate basis and a massive scale.
Back in 1972, Judge Lewis Powell (later elevated to the
78 Aronowitz, p. 173.
79 Bercuson, et al., p. 13.
80 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2, emphasis added.
81 ibid., p. 21.
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Supreme Court) wrote a memo to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce urging business ‘to buy the top academic 
reputations in the country to add credibility to corporate 
studies and give business a stronger voice on the 
campuses.’82
Therefore, not only are these academic recruits the “experts” of the media, but already 
represent corporate interests in the educational arena.
Flak, the fourth filter of the propaganda model, is defined as “a means of 
disciplining the media”.83 In the university apparatus professors are also given flak and 
disciplined in a variety of ways if they contradict the interests of the socius. As was 
aforementioned (in the last chapter’s discussion on faciality) numerous professors have 
been punished and ridiculed, post-September 11th, because they made critical comments 
about American foreign policy.84 The message is clear: if  what is being taught 
contradicts the status quo then the teachers must be punished or marginalized.
The final filter of the propaganda model is one of procapitalism as a “control 
mechanism”.85 In terms of education, this filter’s meaning is clear. It is one of the 
fundamental assertions of this paper. From the outset of this project we have investigated 
the university as a capitalist “apparatus of capture”, and the educational model has been 
described as “knowledge-capital”.
According to Herman and Chomsky, all five filters o f the propaganda model
interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material 
of news must pass through successful filters, leaving only 
the cleansed residue fit to print. They fix the premises of
82 ibid., p. 23.
83 ibid., p. 2.
84 Noble, p. 94.
85 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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discourse and interpretation, and the definition of what is
newsworthy.86
In his essay The Unspeakable: Understanding the System o f Fallacy in the Media, John 
McMurtry points out that such fixed premises render numerous facts “unspeakable”— 
effectively filtered out of the public discourse “because they in one way or other 
contradict justification of the structure of social rule by which they are surrounded.”87 
One such “unspeakable” fact, for example, would be that universities “do not train the 
young to think critically, but to obey corporate or office authority without question.”88 
The university’s educational model, then, also attempts to filter out information which is 
considered unspeakable and thus not “fit to learn”. We have already noted methods of 
control and regimentation that function in order to “fix the premises of [university] 
discourse”. Furthermore, the propaganda model explains another aspect of the 
contradiction between critical freedom and social integration: “these filters occur so 
naturally that media news people, frequently operating with complete integrity and 
goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news 
‘objectively’ and on the basis of professional news values.”89 With similar filters 
operating in the world of the university, many professors may feel they are acting with a 
similar integrity without even noticing the capitalist control of knowledge—the knowledge 
economy—ox, perhaps like Dewey, Laidler, and Bercuson and his crew, many professors 
believe that this knowledge economy is something to which their courses must conform.
What is important to note, then, is that in both mass media and the educational 
system there is a “basic social structural fact... [which] is that large capitalist
86 ibid.
87 McMurtry, p. 139.
88 ibid., p. 138.
89 Herman and Chomsky, p. 2.
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corporations... control production and distribution of social goods so as to maximize 
private capital or social command owned by these capitalist corporations”.90 Thus there 
is an underlying principle which constitutes “the regulative structure o f context within 
which public discourse and communication are situated.”91 This regulative structure is 
coincides with Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model —a succession of educational 
filters or gates (ibid., p. 136)~and the context is the delirium of Capitalism. Not only 
does such a propaganda model attempt to render certain facts “unspeakable” but, as 
McMurtry notes, it produces “a second-order rale against recognizing there is a rale 
against their social assertion.”92 In other words, there is a structural attempt to rale out 
recognition that there is a regulative structure that precludes criticism from the arena of 
discourse.
Conclusion
At this point in the paper I have hopefully made a number of ideas clear. This 
thesis began by asserting the contradiction between critical freedom and social 
integration: there is a freedom to study and learn and publish, but the university exists in 
order to integrate students into the socius. Each chapter has examined aspects of this 
contradiction, culminating in this chapter where the contradiction was investigated in 
light of the university’s educational model. This contradiction is not merely a 
fundamental contradiction in the liberal university, but a shadow of the contradictory 
aspects of capitalism—just as it was supposed that the university is the shadow of the 
State and society’s dominant ideology.
90 McMurtry, p. 134.
91 ibid., p. 135.
92 ibid., p. 139.
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Moreover, hopefully a number of potential contradictions in this very paper have 
been dealt with. The fact that the alienated student is oppressed by her professor, for 
instance, would seem to contradict the other assertions in which the professor has been 
portrayed as the oppressed as well, and not the oppressor. According to Freire’s “teacher- 
student contradiction”, however, such a conceptual problem is done away with: both 
teacher and student are controlled but the capitalist educational framework sets up a 
hierarchy in which the student is below the teacher—one is labourer and the other 
manager, but both are ultimately alienated workers. The second conceptual problem this 
paper presented was the second chapter’s focus on regimentation and control; the 
university was likened to a giant machine in which all are captured, disciplined, and 
enslaved. The contradictory educational nature of the university discussed in this chapter, 
however, should make the truth of this regimentation and control clear; there is a 
regimental nature to the university that attempts to bind the freedom inside its gates. It is 
this critical freedom and its potential to be extended outside of the university that will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
towards a new pedagogy
“Future outlines for liberation... must find a key to 
unlocking the closed, reactionary consciousness and 
awakening the desire for emancipation and 
liberation.”
Red Army Faction, Statement o f  the RAF (the 1998 
disbanding o f  the Red Arm y Faction)
Introduction
It should be obvious at this point that the philosophical framework of the 
university is flawed due to the contradictions discussed in the previous chapter. 
University reforms, of the kind supported by Laidler or Bercuson, are usually aimed at 
fixing problems within a flawed institution rather than fixing the institution in and of 
itself. Such reforms, then, will merely be a tinkering with the apparatus of capture, a 
maintenance of the educational machine. This strategy is akin to fixing the piping of a 
building which suffers from foundational problems. Furthermore, such reforms are 
tolerated and even encouraged by the socius as a whole, as evidenced by the Laidler 
study, Bercuson and his allies, and other latter-day Deweys. Reforming and permitting 
the critical freedom within the university while still encouraging social integration is 
regressive, and in no way aids a true reformation.
By permitting “increases and improvements of standards at the center”, the 
university “displaces the harshest forms of exploitation from the center to the periphery, 
but also multiplies enclaves of overpopulation in the center itself, and easily tolerates the 
so-called [freedom].”1 Even though subject to alienation and regimentation, the 
population of privileged students are able to enjoy a break from the real world of work 
while they remain at the centre of a bounded world of higher education. Moreover, such 
a freedom is tolerated because it does not threaten the overall goal of economic
1 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 373.
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integration and machinic enslavement with which the socius is concerned. “It is not 
kibbutz-style socialism that troubles the Zionist state,” write Deleuze and Guattari, “just 
as it [was] not Russian socialism that trouble[d] world capitalism.”2 Just as Zionist 
imperialism is not threatened by the freedom of the kibbutz, and Russian socialism, 
lacking true freedom, was able to be integrated into the capitalist world order, similarly 
the freedom of liberal pedagogical reforms do not threaten the capitalist university 
institution and are easily integrated into the overall framework. Thus, it is the framework 
of the university itself that must be changed—a framework which should not exist as a 
mere shadow of the socius as it has in the past.
With this concluding chapter I hope to describe the shape of a radical, liberatory 
pedagogy which could possibly resolve the contradiction between critical freedom and 
social integration. The shape of such a pedagogy, however, is just that: a shape. Given 
the social reality within which the modem university is situated, it is not completely 
possible for a radically free pedagogy to be instituted, and I will discuss this problem 
towards the end of this section.
The path towards examining a different system of pedagogy has lead through a 
number of interrelated terrains: it began with an examination of the capitalist nature of the 
university; it traveled through the territory where this nature caused discipline and 
regimentation, and it progressed through the area where the contradictions of the previous 
regions were revealed. Now the path this thesis has taken will near its goal, beginning 
with a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of liberating desire. I will follow this 
up with Guattari’s idea of molecular revolutions, and with Freire’s theory of education in 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Finally, I hope to tie all of these concepts together and in a 
description of the shape of a radical pedagogy.
2 ibid., p. 373-374.
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Liberating unconscious desire
In the art house horror film Profundo Rosso (“Deep Red”), by acclaimed Italian 
filmmaker Dario Argento, the mystery of a brutal hatchet murder becomes an obsession 
for the jazz musician protagonist. The protagonist, however, begins his own private 
investigation of this murder based on a framework of presuppositions and biases, not only 
about the murder but about life itself. At one point in the film the protagonist discovers 
an infantile painting hidden behind a wall covered in plaster in an old house, a painting 
which he believes is a vital clue. As he scratches away the plaster to reveal the picture 
beneath he discovers a depiction of another murder which confirms his previous biases 
about his own investigation. Pleased with this discovery the obsessive jazz musician 
leaves the house. As this character walks out of frame, however, another chunk of plaster 
falls from the wall and reveals another part of the portrait which throws the protagonist’s 
entire framework into question. It is too late, though, the main character has already left, 
having stopped his examination of this vital clue at a point that justified his earlier 
assumptions. Furthermore, the protagonist’s inability to question the dominant 
interpretation of the murder eventually causes him to make illogical deductions resulting 
in the death of one of his friends and the hospitalization of another.
Dewey and his antecedents begin their critique of the educational institution in a 
manner similar to the protagonist of Profundo Rosso. They assume the capitalist 
framework and accept the implications it entails. As I have already noted, the liberal 
educational project presupposes a model of economic integration. The university is 
viewed as an institution that presupposes, reproduces, and reinforces the economic reality 
of society. Therefore, in order to solve problems within the university, reforms are 
pursued that accept the economic function of this institution as a given. Far from solving 
the problems of education, however, this framework aids an educational murder. Far 
from being a simple philosophical blunder, this problematic approach is symptomatic of
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capitalist thinking—educational philosophy is merely shadowed by the dominant ideology 
of the socius which holds that all institutions must be part of its delirium.
Part of the logic of capitalism is “to present its work process as natural and 
unchangeable, [even though] for technical reasons it is changing every day”.3 The 
capitalist delirium has been accepted as an invariant and unchangeable reality; one has to 
accept the worldwide market and modem capitalist modes of production in order to 
succeed. But not only did the market depend on quite specific social relations, it is 
always changing since, according to Deleuze and Guattari, it possess no definite 
“coding”--the capitalism of early industrialism is different, in many respects, from the 
capitalism today. Nevertheless, “[a]n equation is established, in which capitalist 
advancement and exploitation are seen as essential features of social machinery-that is 
the meaning of society, and of course it has become true.. .”4 In other words, although 
the capitalist reality is constantly changing (from industrialism to post-industrialism), the 
population at large accepts its delirium as essential to societal functioning, the reason 
being that “Communism” (perceived as the only alternative to capitalism) has failed and 
so capitalism is the only valid system. By investing our desire in this belief, we allow this 
reality (which is really a delirium) to govern our lives, even though our very investment 
and beliefs prove the capitalist reality is reified and is nothing more than delirium, a true 
consciousness of false reality.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, this logic of capitalism is accepted because, as 
with previous social systems, our unconscious desire (what we really want and need) has 
been co-opted and infused with the ideology of capitalism:
the unconscious productions and formations [of desire] 
were not merely repelled by an agency of psychic repression 
that would enter into compromises with them, but actually
3 Guattari and Negri, p. 15.
4 ibid., p. 23.
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covered over by anti-formations that disfigure the 
unconscious in itself, and impose on it causations, 
comprehensions, and expressions that no longer have 
anything to do with its real functioning.5
Thus our desire to work with a community is distorted and transformed into a desire to 
work an alienating forty hours at an office with other overworked bureaucrats. Our desire 
to survive is perverted until we end up with a desire to climb the social ladder of wage- 
slavery. Our desire to learn becomes a desire to learn a discipline that will give us a well- 
paying job. We are conditioned, from birth, to associate with people and objects in a 
capitalist manner: “[cjhildren begin learning about capitalism in the cradle, before they 
have access to speech. They learn to perceive capitalist objects and relations on 
television, through the family, in the nursery.”6
The evidence of this capitalist co-optation of desire is found in the liberal model 
of education. Dewey, Laidler, and Bercuson all genuinely desire a reformation of the 
university institution, but their desire for this reformation has already been co-opted by 
the capitalist socius—“an idea that [capitalist] ‘reason’ imposes on the unconscious and 
introduces into the passional sphere, and is not by any means the formation o f this 
sphere' ’.7 Therefore, liberal reformers’ desire to mend the university apparatus becomes 
wed to a desire to perpetuate the delirium of capitalism. Thus, they contradict the desire 
for freedom that they purport to espouse. The poles of production and antiproduction 
become fused together:
Oh, to be sure, it is not for himself or his children that the 
capitalist works, but for the immortality of the system. A 
violence without purpose, a joy, a pure joy in feeling 
oneself a wheel in the machine... Placing oneself in a
5 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 338-339.
6 Guattari, p. 10.
7 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 323, emphasis added.
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position where one is thus traversed, broken, fucked by the 
socius, looking for the right place where, according to the 
aims and the interests assigned to us... each one in his own 
place, the banker, the cop, the soldier, the technocrat, the 
bureaucrat.8
In other words: the proletarianization o f the world. By distorting desire, capitalism 
becomes the dominant framework.
Returning to the model of Argento’s film, the protagonist’s obsessive desire to 
solve the brutal hatchet murder was, from the very beginning, subordinated to his 
preconceived notions about society in general. He not only attaches himself to the 
official police framework concerning the case, but he allows his desire for closure to be 
invested with numerous social biases. For example, he believes that women are 
essentially weaker and passive, and he believes that homosexuals are social deviants. The 
incomplete portrait behind the plaster displays the murderer as a homosexual man, while 
the complete picture reveals the truth: the actual killer is a heterosexual woman. 
Analogously, with their own desire attached to the logic of capitalism, liberal educational 
reformers are defined by an inability to grasp the fundamental problem of education—the 
contradiction between critical freedom and social integration—and end up supporting this 
“killer” by accepting the philosophy of the socius.
Thus “Capitalism remains a formidable desiring machine”, and its co-opted flows 
of desire flood “the schools, the factories, the neighbourhoods, the prisons, etc.”9 With 
unconscious desire functioning in such a manner, any real change “is not a question of 
adapting it, socializing it, disciplining [the university institution],” as liberal reformers 
would have one believe, “but of plugging it in such a way that its process not be 
interrupted in the social body, and that its expression is collective.”10 Although the logic
8 ibid., p. 346-347.
9Deleuze a n d  G u a t t a r i ,  "Capitalism: AVery Special Delirium” , p. 219.
10 ibid.
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of capitalism may, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, function at an unconscious level, they 
also suggest we can change our unconscious~we can liberate our desire. For Deleuze and 
Guattari such a liberation is possible because “the unconscious” is not a secret world 
inhabited by Freudian structures which are intrinsic to our nature as human beings; it is 
simply what the word itself implies: what we are not conscious o f—it is not a 
“subconscious”. Therefore, we can make ourselves conscious of our desire and how it 
has been appropriated by the socius by asking the question “what do I  really desire?”, and 
affect “a revolutionary break [with co-opted desire] at the unconscious level”.11
For underneath our co-opted desire we truly possess a desire for freedom and 
community; humans are, after all, social animals and most great political theorists have 
recognized this fact. Indeed, States themselves are founded on the desire to live in 
community, and the desire for political freedom has been articulated in countless 
instances-the French Revolution, the fight for the abolition of slavery, Mandela’s 
struggle against apartheid, etc. While this desire may be appropriated by the capitalist 
socius—where countless McCarthies and Bushes can claim that any hatred of capitalism 
and/or imperialism is a hatred of freedom-this desire can also be liberated as soon as its 
co-option is recognized.
Although I do not want to get sidetracked by what authentic liberation means, part 
of its definition should be obvious. The above examples, for instance, were defined in 
part by the concept of self-determination (the slaves should be freed to determine 
themselves as humans, not to be sold as animals). Even the McCarthies and Bushes 
would accede to this definition, but their practices reduce such a definition to mere 
propaganda (peoples’ ability to determine themselves, for example, can only be achieved 
under the framework of the free market), and contradict this definition by their practices
11 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 375.
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(financing death-squads, setting up puppet-dictatorships, etc.). Thus an authentic straggle 
for freedom is defined by the implicit desire to liberate a person or group from institutions 
or governments which negatively affect its development as human, whereas inauthentic 
straggles for freedom are defined by an underlying desire to merely topple one form of 
slavery for another (ie. in the film Burn!, the British government incites a slave revolution 
in order to overthrow the Dutch government, take over, and turn the former slaves into 
wage-slaves).
But let us return to the concept of co-opted desire as it is depicted in Profundo 
Rosso. Argento’s protagonist’s authentic desire is partially defined by an obsession with 
what he believes to be a crucial piece of evidence, a missing painting from the scene of 
the crime. At the conclusion of the film, however, he returns to the crime scene and 
learns that there never was a missing picture. Rather, he had actually seen a mirror which 
had reflected the face of the killer as it stood behind him and in front of another painting. 
Staring at his own reflection in the mirror, the truth of the killer’s identity is finally 
revealed. As soon as the protagonist confronts his own assumptions, the lies are exposed 
and the film ends. Analogously, this thesis has attempted to confront the capitalist 
assumptions of liberal educators; in the next two sections I hope to end this project by 
tracing a path which will allow for Deleuze and Guattari’s “revolutionary break at the 
unconscious level”.
Molecular revolutions
The project, then, is to discover the shape of a truly revolutionary desire for 
education. The problem, however, is that “desire is being delegated to representatives 
and bureaucrats of all kinds... [and] is turned into organizational microfascism.”12 In
12 Guattari, p. 10.
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other words, since our authentic desire has been wed to the forces of capitalism it has 
begun to regiment our lives in accordance with the capitalist socius. Our desire for a 
liberatory pedagogy, in other words, has become mixed up with the regimental nature of 
the liberal university. As aforementioned, capitalism has co-opted desire through “the 
semiotic subjugation of all individuals”13—a regime of signs, a faciality machine. From 
the cradle to the grave individuals learn to “perceive capitalist objects and relations on 
television, through the family, in the nursery”14, or through numerous institutions 
including the university.
Therefore, in terms of the university apparatus, the student essentially learns “a 
behavioural model adapted to certain social castes.”15 The regimentation and discipline 
discussed in previous chapters all contribute to to the semiotic subjugation of the student:
What you require of your students before all else when you 
make them take an exam is a certain style of semiotic 
moulding, a certain initiation to the given castes. This 
initiation is all the more brutal in the context of manual 
formation, with the training of workers. Exams, the 
movement from position to position in factory work, 
always depend on whether one is Black, Puerto Rican, or 
raised in a well-to-do neighbourhood, whether one has the 
right accent, is a man or woman.16
Although the modem liberal university may pride itself on its tolerance and equity, it is 
still a place where there “are signs of recognition, signs of power that operate during 
instmctional formation, and they are veritable rites of initiation.”17 Bercuson, for
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
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example, while glorifying the freedom of the university, still defended the privileged 
position of the white male.18
Moreover, the signs and structures of power were evident in the very mode that 
Felix Guattari delivered the lecture, at a university convention, upon which this section is 
based. Guattari writes:
One... truly awful arrangement from the vantage point of 
the arrangements of desire—is that of this room itself, with 
some individual raised above everyone else, with a prepared 
discussion which would make it impossible for anyone 
really to start a discussion.19
Guattari even suggested that the format of the session should be changed, but those 
present refused, some even asked for the return of their money.20 The issue, then, was 
not the information being transmitted, but the authoritarian manner in which this 
transmission was arranged. The lecturer speaks and those gathered desire to be spoken at, 
feeling that this is what education is all about: the teacher-student contradiction.
According to Guattari, it is important to work towards new arrangements of desire 
which will effectively break from a system that replicates capitalist arrangements. These 
new arrangements o f  enunciation^, Guattari claims, are “developing today, but at the 
molecular or microscopic level.”22 Hence the term, molecular revolution. When Guattari 
speaks of “molecular revolutions” he is referring to the idea of “the molar” and “the 
molecular” which is discussed at length in A Thousand Plateaus, co-authored with 
Deleuze. Every society is composed by an interrelation between the molar and the
18 Bercuson, p. 48, see previous chapter.
19 G u a t t a r i ,  p. 13.
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 ibid., p. 8.
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molecular. The former term designates a “realm of representations... [that] define large- 
scale aggregates”23 (ie. a class designation, a type of State, etc.), and the latter term refers 
to a “realm of beliefs and desires in which the distinction between the social and the 
individual loses all meaning”24—the realm of authentic desire. The molar level, of course, 
is composed by the molecular flows of desire: the socius as a “desiring-machine,” a social 
machine which appropriates collective desire and links such desire to the propagation of 
capital. Although “politics and its judgments are always molar”—America, for example, 
attacked Grenada because it was going to form a collectivist economy and block 
American investment—“it is the molecular and its assessment that makes it or breaks it.”25 
In the earlier case of the Vietnam war, for instance, the authentic “molecular” desire for 
freedom was able to affect a molar movement within and without the socius (individuals 
banded together to protest and resist, and Viet-Cong revolutionaries fought a successful 
guerrilla battle); America had to pull out of the war.
Molecular revolutions, then, are small revolutionary struggles that develop in 
different capitalist institutions and are aimed at reconstituting revolutionary desire: “[w]e 
see students revelling, playing at the barricades. We see teenagers changing life in the 
highschools.”26 In 1995 and 1996, for example “the email coordination of multicampus 
protests [brought change] against reductions in student aid and rising tuition fees in 
Canada and the United States.”27 The problem, though, is that the socius is quite apt at 
appropriating this desire and recasting every struggle it confronts. In the face of student 
discontent, for example, liberal reformers step in to convince the alienated rebels that
23 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 219.
24 Guattari, p. 8.
25 ibid., p. 222.
26 ibid.
27 Dyer-Witheford, p. 236.
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what is needed is a mere tinkering with the university machine rather than a systematic 
overhaul. Graduate students on strikes are bought off with more money, and they are 
convinced that this is what will settle their demands.
Furthermore, as has been analyzed at numerous points in this thesis, the teachers 
and the students are socially separated by the teacher-student contradiction. The point of 
molecular revolutions, therefore, is to recognize a “revolutionary consciousness... 
situated within a ‘revolutionary body’, that is to say, within a body [that is, any social 
arrangement of persons] that produces its own liberation.”28 This radical change of desire 
will be further elaborated and explained when we turn to a discussion ofFreire’s 
philosophy. What matters for Guattari, however, is that the “desire for a fundamental 
liberation, if it is to be a truly revolutionary action, requires that we move beyond the 
limits of our ‘person’... that we transcend our sedentary selves, our ‘normal social 
identities’” 29 In other words, in order to affect a true liberation of education, students 
and teachers must overcome the co-option of their own unconscious desires and revolt 
against the social roles assigned to them by the apparatus of capture.
Once again I would like to stress that this molecular revolution need not be a 
renunciation of education altogether. After all, “one can hardly imagine refusing to teach 
[students] how to write or to recognize linguistic... signs. What matters is whether one 
uses this semiotic apprenticeship to bring together power and the semiotic subjugation of 
the individual, or i f  one does something else.”30 In order for a real, liberatory education 
to take place, however, the contradiction discussed in this thesis must be abolished.
Accomplishing this requires a movement—to change the 
character of [the university] itself. And redefining 
[education] as creative activity can only happen as
28Guattari, p. 30,
29 ibid., p. 32.
30 ibid., p. 22, emphasis added.
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individuals emerge from stifled, emotionally blocked 
rhythms of constraint.31
This redefinition—the emergence of the radical shape of pedagogy—will be discussed in 
the following section.
A radical pedagogy
It should be obvious, then, that a new and radical form of education is needed in 
order to dissolve the current contradiction within which the liberal university is trapped. 
There needs to be a fundamental change in the character of pedagogy—a different kind of 
education. In 1970, the Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire developed this different kind 
of pedagogical system in which those educated would “come to a new awareness of 
selfhood and begin to look critically at the social situation in which they find 
themselves”32, and desire to change society.
Originally designed for an uneducated peasant population, Freire’s philosophy of 
education “enabled three hundred workers in the town of Angicas, Northern Rio Grande, 
Brazil, to become literate in forty-five days. In addition to being able read and write, they 
were also politically literate.”33 And in “Chile, where he worked on Agrarian Reform 
project, [Freire] cut the illiteracy rate to five per cent in six years.”34 Although Freire’s 
philosophy is primarily orientated towards illiterate adults, it would be a mistake to 
assume that his pedagogical approach cannot be applied to post-secondary education:
his methodology as well as his educational philosophy are 
as important for us as for the dispossessed in Latin 
America. Their struggle to become free Subjects and to
31 G u a t t a r i  and Negri, p. 13-14.
32  S h a u l l ,  Richard, from the Forward to Pedagogy o f the Oppressed, p. 11.
33 Boyd, p. 203.
34 ibid., p. 204.
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participate in the transformation of their society is similar, 
in many ways, to the struggle... of middle-class young 
people in this country... And the sharpness and intensity of 
that struggle in the developing world may well provide us 
with new insight, new models, and a new hope as we face 
our own situation.35
Basing myself on this interpretation, I will use Freire’s philosophy in order to frame a 
new model for education, a model which will promote the revolutionary desire for 
liberation. The investigation of such a model will begin by discussing it in relation to the 
banking concept and the teacher-student contradiction, and then conclude with an analysis 
of Freire’s idea of dialogics and how this pedagogical method relates to a liberation of 
desire.
In the last chapter I outlined Freire’s analysis of the banking concept of education. 
As we saw, this model produces a “teacher-student contradiction.” It is this concept 
which must be abandoned in order to resolve its contradiction. “Liberating education,” 
writes Freire, “consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information.”36 The 
banking concept must be rejected in order to create a new concept of the student-a 
concept which does not view women and men as vessels of knowledge that need to be 
filled, but as “conscious beings, and consciousness as consciousness intent upon the 
world.”37 In other words, education should strive to produce a consciousness that is 
rooted in reality and not delirium.
Human beings, according to Freire, are historical and possess the ability to engage 
with reality. They create and change it. “To exist, humanly,” he writes, “is to name the 
world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a
35 Shaull, p. 10.
36 Freire, p. 60.
37 ibid.
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problem and requires of them a new naming. ”38 As humans we are part of a history of 
knowledge in which we have engaged with our world and attempted to comprehend and 
name it--to map its reality, so to speak. Aristotle, to cite one example, wrote the 
Categories in which he attempted to name foundational concepts so others could 
understand the world. The Categories, however, re-presented the world as a new problem 
and others would eventually participate in a new naming. Histories are constructed by a 
method of naming and renaming, and this is why humans possess the ontological nature 
of historical beings. In other words, if  humans did not exist, the concept o f the world 
would not exist; there would be no one around to say this is the world.39 Therefore, 
“[h]uman beings are not built on silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection.”40
The banking concept of education, however, denies humans their ontological 
vocation by reducing the educational process to a structure of facts which proceed from 
an authoritarian lectern. Students are certainly shown how all of these facts are 
questionable—how all the names can be renamed—and sometimes they are even given the 
tools to question and rename. But at the end of their term their education terminates with 
an exam or final paper, and they become a disciplined individual in an economic reality 
which cannot be renamed. The authority that names, at the same time defines the limits 
of questionability. Humanity’s ontological function as historical beings requires an 
education which allows for a critical engagement, and promotes the ability to change 
society as a whole.
Thus, in order to reach a radically free pedagogy, we “must abandon the 
educational goal of deposit-making and replace it with the posing of the problems of
38 ibid., p. 69.
39 ibid., p. 63.
40 ibid.
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human beings in their relations with the world.”41 This problem  posing education is a 
system of pedagogy which resolves the teacher-student contradiction. “It is a learning 
situation in which the cognizable object [of education] intermediates the cognitive actors- 
-teachers on the one hand and students on the other”42-and  the process of education 
becomes dialogical:
Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the 
students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term 
emerges: teacher-student and students-teachers. The 
teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one 
who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in 
turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly 
responsible for a process in which all grow 43
Freire is not describing a chaotic classroom free-for-all, but an organized process of 
dialogue. At an elementary school level this process might be absurd (one envisions 
children running amok, eating paste), but at a university level this process could definitely 
take place. An organized dialogical process of education does not eliminate authority 
altogether, it just eliminates authoritarian structures of pedagogy; “authority must be on 
the side of Freedom, not against it.”44 In other words, professors will lead the dialogue 
but they do not own the process: “the problem-posing educator constantly re-forms his 
reflections in the reflection of the students.”45 One can imagine how this process of 
dialogue could take place at a basic classroom level. When I was in high school, for 
instance, there was one English teacher who structured his classes in this dialogical 
manner: he would dispense with his lectem and the regimental seating arrangement, sit
41 ibid., p. 60.
42 ibid.
43 ibid., p. 61.
44 ibid.
45 ibid., p. 61-62.
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amongst his students, and strike up an informal dialogue about our readings. Not only 
would this teacher ask the students questions, but the students were encouraged to 
question and argue with the teacher. Moreover, this teacher never used his educational 
authority to dismiss certain questions; he often admitted he was in the wrong and showed 
a genuine care and interest in everyone of his students’ opinions. Students in this 
teachers’ class displayed a great interest to learn—they all wanted to bring something to 
the dialogical process—and flourished under his encouragement.
Freire also holds that through a process of dialogue, education will become the 
practice of cognitive freedom. Such a practice, since it is mediated by the social reality it 
is situated within, “denies that man is abstract, isolated, independent, and unattached to 
the world; it also denies that the world exists as a reality apart from people.”46 As has 
been discussed at various points in this thesis, the capitalist system creates a delirium by 
presenting its reality as unchangeable and eternal, even though capitalism is created by, 
and supported by, social relations-relations that have been reified. By freely dialoguing 
with knowledge and education in a manner unremoved from the social reality, people 
become aware of their own human vocation and their own ability to change society. 
Through Freire’s dialogics, the new student learns that her education is not divorced from 
the world. Moreover, by participating in the active process of her own education, the 
student will possibly have a desire awakened in her to continue this process outside of the 
university setting. Freire, after all, was kicked out of Chile because he awakened this 
desire in the peasants with whom he worked. Although there is a slight chance that some 
students-like the audience at Guattari’s lecture—might rebel because too much is asked 
of them, Freire, as will be evidenced below, never had to deal with this problem. This 
fact may be due, in part, to the foundational concepts about dialogue of which this 
specific pedagogical philosophy is composed.
46 ibid., p. 62.
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Since Freire’s concept of dialogue “is the encounter between men, mediated by 
the world, in order to name the world”47, there are numerous concepts about dialogue 
which he lays out in order to qualify his philosophy. As aforementioned, this radical 
concept of education cannot be a chaotic free-for-all; if one is to learn, there must be a 
conceptual framework. This framework, however, cannot be one that permits the 
regimental nature of the current educational system. Although Freire's dialogical process 
is specifically orientated towards illiterate, adult peasants there are a number of lessons 
which can be deduced.
First of all, dialogue “cannot exist... in the absence of a profound love for the 
world and for people.”48 Naming and engaging with the world, after all, is an act of 
creation, and problem posing education is an act of mutual pedagogy performed out of 
respect of a mutual humanity. If one enters into educational dialogue with the desire to 
dominate the students through this dialogue, one replicates oppression and reinstates the 
teacher-student contradiction. “If I do not love the world,” writes Freire, “if I do not love 
life—if I do not love people—I cannot enter into dialogue.”49 Obviously, the love meant 
here is not romantic and/or erotic love, but what the Greeks would have called agape— 
fellowship, a love for humanity where one conceives of one’s own humanity as part of the 
humanity of the others involved in dialogue.
Secondly, “dialogue cannot exist without humility.”50 Without humility one 
dialoguing party will project ignorance into the other and hence be unable to perform 
dialogue since the other party will be regarded as inferior. The absence of humility again 
reinforces the teacher-student contradiction and disrupts the mutual process of education:
47 ibid., p. 69.
48 ibid., p. 70.
49 ibid., p. 71.
50 ibid.
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“[sjomeone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a 
long way to go before he can reach the point of [a dialogical] encounter.”51 If the 
facilitator of this educational interchange infuses the dialogue with humility, then no one 
side will be a depositor in a banking process of education; “there are only people who are 
attempting together, to learn more than they now know.”52
Thirdly, dialogue “requires an intense faith in humankind, faith in their power to 
make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in their vocation to be more fully 
human”.53 Without this faith in the students engaged in dialogue, the dialogical process 
is reduced to manipulation—a manipulation that attempts to force others to think in a 
certain manner and to perceive a certain truth that one believes the students would fail to 
grasp by themselves. (One cannot accept, therefore, the media myth that students are all 
beer-swilling frat boys; the existence of such students, as discussed earlier, is due to an 
educational contradiction contained in the liberal model of the university: stupidity wed to 
knowledge)
Finally,
true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in 
critical thinking—thinking which discerns an indivisible 
solidarity between the world and the people and admits of 
no dichotomy between them—thinking which perceives 
reality as process, as transformation, rather than as a static 
entity—thinking which does not separate itself from action, 
but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear 




54 ibid., p. 73.
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In other words, a critical freedom that is not bound within the world of academia. 
Although the values espoused by Freire are, indeed, “liberal” values, this process of 
pedagogy permits a critical freedom that is concerned with the world outside of the 
university, a type of freedom sorely lacking in the current liberal model of education.
Freire believes that individuals engaged in the dialogical process must overcome 
their appropriated desire—a desire that has been perverted into a desire to bow to the 
socius: “I have encountered, both in training courses... and in actual experimentation 
with a truly liberating education, the ‘fear of freedom’”.55 As Deleuze and Guattari have 
pointed out, individuals’ authentic desire for freedom is co-opted by the “desiring- 
machine” of the socius so that “they confuse freedom with the maintenance of the status 
quo”.56 Part of Freire’s dialogical pedagogy, however, affects a revolution at the 
molecular level; it enables individuals to see their selves and their setting through a 
critical and liberating dialogue. Critics of Freire’s position have exhibited this fear of 
liberation, however, by claiming that such a system might lead to “destructive fanaticism” 
or a “sensation of total collapse of [the students’] world.”57 A peasant who had engaged 
in Freire’s pedagogical process, however, replied to these objections:
Perhaps I am the only one here of working-class origin. I 
can’t say that I’ve understood everything you’ve said just 
now, but I can say one thing—when I began this course I 
was naive, and when I found out how naive I was, I started 
to get critical. But this discovery hasn’t made me a fanatic, 
and I don’t feel any collapse either.58
55 ibid., p. 17.
56 ibid., p. 18.
57 ibid., p. 17.
58 ibid.
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Thus, Freire’s philosophy describes a radically new approach to education which 
not only resolves the contradiction between critical freedom and economic integration (it 
holds that critical freedom must affect the social setting), but possesses the power to 
affect a molecular revolution of desire. The peasant who was quoted, after all, critically 
investigated his presuppositions and soon desired to change his world. Imagine the 
revolutionary power universities in North America would possess if their students, 
working in conjunction with the professors, began to adopt this critical mind set. In the 
following section of this chapter I will investigate the possible implementation of a 
radical pedagogy.
Conclusion - the shape of radical pedagogy
There are, o f course, conceptual problems concerning the adoption of a radical 
pedagogy. Probably the largest problem would be that of institutionalization: how does 
one create universities founded on a dialogical process of education, and/or how does one 
change the existing universities? This problem, however, is another thesis altogether.
The task of bringing a radically free university into being is vast and would require 
devoted individuals; it requires a molecular revolution in order to become a molar 
movement. And, obviously, different types of dialogics would need to be adapted for 
different educational settings. The method of dialogue in Philosophy, for example, would 
be different than the method of dialogue in Chemistry.
Moreover, there is the fundamental problem about the change of this pedagogy 
even existing. As I have stated, the university apparatus is a reflection of the socius. 
Indeed, it exists because it is funded by the socius; it is not hard to imagine that the 
economic nourishment would stop if the university began to critically question the hand 
that feeds it. On the other hand, a privatised university would just be another spectre of 
capitalism: corporations—which are pure reflections of the socius—would control 
education and access to education would be limited to the economically privileged. And
112
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
universities are already entering into alliances with corporations; this has only served to 
make them more machine like. Even Freire understood this problem: “only a 
revolutionary society can carry out this education in systematic terms”.59
Nevertheless, Freire was able to implement his philosophy with the help of grass­
roots organizations (a molecular revolution at the heart of Brazil and then Chile) and so 
maybe a grass roots movement of this kind will slowly spread, from molecular to molar, 
creating wide institutional change. Furthermore, the philosophy of a radical pedagogical 
system provides a critique of the liberal framework; it shows that the university, as it has 
been presented by liberal reformers, is not a monolithic capitalist structure. It reveals the 
university’s potential.
This being said, I will attempt to outline this potential shape which a radically free 
university might take. The core concept of Freire’s pedagogical requirements is 
cooperation-, “[sjubjects meet in cooperation in order to transform the world.”60 In an 
educational setting, the importance of cooperation does not preclude any role for teachers 
but means that teachers “do not own [the students’ education] and have no right to steer 
[the students] blindly”.61 Therefore, any given university classroom must encourage a 
free cooperative spirit: students and teachers should work together through a praxis- 
oriented education, thus beginning a molecular movement—a connection between faculty 
and students in different classrooms. This education must be an education which is 
concerned with the social reality outside of the university instead of simply studies 
abstracted from society (ie. the study of chemistry should not be divorced from the study 
of how chemistry research has been used for the construction of chemical weapons).
59 ibid., p. 67.
60 ibid., p. 148.
61 ibid., p. 149.
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Indeed, Freire’s philosophy has described how the pedagogical system in a classroom can 
be radicalized
The university classroom, however, is not the only issue at stake. The university 
is an institution and, as an institution, its nature as a capitalist apparatus of capture has 
been shown to go farther than the classroom—the reified administrative structure and its 
existence as a capitalist space. Since the university has been an institution where “the 
internal operations of academia [have] become steadily more corporatized, with 
management practices mirroring those of the private sector”62, then the entire institution 
must be transformed—the administration must be reduced to a bare minimum (just 
secretarial management, perhaps), tuition should be free, and the institution should be 
democratic-students, teachers, and administration having equal input and voting power- 
when it comes to making institutional choices. Such a transformation may not be 
impossible; since this essay has admitted that there is a core of critical freedom evident in 
the university, there should be a way this freedom can flee the capitalist apparatus of 
capture—a line o f flight. According to Deleuze and Guattari:
a society is defined by its line of flight... There is always 
something [that is, consciousness] that flows or flees, that 
escapes the binary organizations, the resonance apparatus, 
and the overcoding machine: things that are attributed to a 
‘change in values, the youth, women, the mad, etc.63
For Deleuze and Guattari, no matter how harsh the nature of any given political or 
institutional assemblage, there is always a route of escape that our revolutionary desire 
takes. In the case of the university, this line of flight may be the study of social theory 
that enable critical texts to be written and produced. The point for Deleuze and Guattari, 
however, is to pursue this escape route in any way possible.
62 Dyer-Witheford, p. 110.
63 Deleuze and Guattari, 1000 Plateaus, p. 216.
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Although the university is, in Debord’s terms, a capitalist space—constructed to 
reflect the realities of the socius-its very assemblage can be used to subvert its nature.
As Dyer-Witheford writes in Cyber-Marx:
It is widely known that in the aftermath of the 1848 
proletarian uprisings in Paris, Napoleon III ordered Baron 
Haussmann to redesign the city, and that a centerpiece of 
this urban reconstruction was the widening of streets to 
allow the passage of artillery for the suppression of any 
future insurrections. What is less well known is that 
workers employed on this highway development project, 
impoverished masons and builders housed in squalid 
Parisian slums, were leading participants in the next 
revolutionary outbreak—the 1871 Paris Commune that 
seized the city in its entirety, rocking the stability of 
capitalist Europe and giving Marx a blazing prefigurative 
glimpse of communist society.64
Thus, even though the reconstruction of Parisian space was designed to reinforce State 
power, it was ultimately used to subvert state power; it allowed potential insurrectionists 
to link up and stage a revolution. According to Dyer-Witheford, the current realities of 
capitalism engender similar lines of flight, and while “capital uses the university to 
harness general intellect, insisting its work force engage in lifelong learning as the price 
of employability, it runs the risk that people will teach and learn something other than 
what it intends.”65
In the case of the university this line of flight is taking place, perhaps, at the level 
of those professors who teach radical theory and social criticism and refuse to allow such 
teachings to become reduced to abstractions. Although the university seems to be 
becoming a harsher capitalist workplace—especially with the advent of online education— 
these capitalist conditions will “create the grounds for a new relation between dissenting
64 Dyer-Witheford, p. 128-129.
65 ibid., p. 236.
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academics and oppositional social movements.”66 The fact that the university, as an 
apparatus of capture, is tightening its control on its professors may mean that more 
professors will become willing to take place in the revolutionary transformation of the 
university:
Rather than descending from the heights of the university to 
involve themselves in causes largely external to their daily 
experience, possibilities emerge for academics to make 
more ‘transverse’ connections. Academics perhaps lose 
some pretensions as the bearer of great truths and grand 
analysis, but they become the carriers of particular skills, 
knowledge, and accesses useful to movements in which 
they participate on the basis of increasing commonalities 
with other [societal] members.67
Although the current assemblage of the capitalist university inspires this revolutionary 
line of flight, it is up to professors to involve themselves in this struggle for pedagogical 
transformation. In other words, even though such a revolutionary attitude may be 
engendered by the increasing capitalisation of the university, it is up to the professors— 
and the students as well—to embrace this attitude.
Such an attitude should also be encouraged in the university classroom. If 
classroom dynamics take place in the manner outlined by Freire, then the revolutionary 
counterflow will be strengthened. Students will be taught to participate in their vocation 
of naming society and controlling their means of education. The cooperation between 
faculty and students will galvanize the revolutionary opposition to the capitalist 
university. In 1994, for example, students of Latino and Chicano background at the 
universities of Michigan, Colorado, and Nebraska, staged successful occupations and 
hunger strikes, demanding antiracist initiatives in the university, but also grape boycotts
66 ibid., p. 234-235.
67 ibid., p. 235.
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in support of farm workers across the United States. Their protests were not only 
encouraged by their professors, but were “extensively connected and coordinated by 
computer-communications facilitated by sympathetic librarians, faculty, and union 
organizers.”68 Not only does this situation demonstrate how students and faculty can 
work together, but it also demonstrates how the university can affect social change; the 
boycotts were successful.
Therefore, if radicalization continues at the classroom and faculty level, 
academics and students could be pulled into “contact with other public service workers 
protesting cutbacks, wider labor and trade unionist organizations”69, as the students and 
faculty of the above example eventually found themselves united with trade unions. Such 
contacts will sow the seeds for the university to become a sight of free pedagogy. A 
pedagogy which will, if fully liberated, continuously link up with unions and labour rights 
groups-coordinating education with action. As Freire writes, “[kjnowledge of the 
alienated culture leads to transforming action resulting in a culture which is being freed 
from alienation.”70 The education one learns in the university should be taught in such a 
way that it can be used in the interests of social freedom. The ideal university will have 
perfected this method of teaching, cooperating with social movements outside of the 
university and producing free students who desire to better their society and affect valid 
social change. Furthemore, if the pedagogical methods of Freire begin, now, at a 
molecular level in numerous classrooms, the university will grow more and more radical, 
increasing the chances of the existence of the ideal university in reality.
68 ibid., p. 236.
69 ibid., p. 235.
70 Freire, p. 162.
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EPILOGUE
“philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it."
-Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach ”-
There are probably numerous questions this thesis has evoked in the reader which 
may be cause for concern. I do not pretend to know what all of these questions are but, as 
I conclude this project, I will attempt to address the most salient. There are two basic 
categories of inquiry that I believe these questions will fall under: the first concerns the 
basic presuppositions I have made, and the second concerns the validity of the method of 
pedagogy suggested in the last chapter.
Concerning this thesis’ presuppositions one may argue, you claim that the liberal 
philosophers o f  education do not question their capitalist framework, but you fa il to 
question the validity o f  the anti-capitalist theories you utilize. From the very outset of 
this project I have engaged with various theoretical frameworks of Marxist and post- 
Marxist origin. It is true that I do not frilly question these modes of discourse, but the 
ultimate test of any theory is whether it reveals some critical truth. It should be clear to 
anyone who even attempts to look at this world critically that there is something wrong 
with an educational system that claims to possess a method of free discourse and yet may 
also shove students into a system that, to the a certain degree, “continues to subjugate all 
desires... and affects to the dictatorship of its totalitarian organization, founded on 
exploitation, property, male power, profit, productivity.”1
Few would claim that there is nothing wrong with an institution which contradicts 
itself at every turn: you ’re free, but only free to get a job . Moreover, the illogical nature 
of the socius at large should be evident every time one turns on the television or reads the 
newspaper. The totalitarian nature of integrated world capitalism is conveyed in the 
speeches by United States Presidents and United Nations officials. We are living in an
1 Guattari, p. 29.
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era where corporations can sue developing countries in the interest of the world market. 
Therefore, theories which question this world-wide system reveal its inherent 
contradictions and are thus true to that extent.
Furthermore, Dewey’s antecedents, while admitting that there is indeed something 
wrong with the university, have failed to reform this institution; it is still the same old 
system—maybe a little different from the days of yore, but an ivory-tower nonetheless. 
Higher education may have been made more accessible, but it is still an insulated world 
of privilege. Increasing tuition rates are slowly eroding accessibility; liberal reforms are 
running their due course: orientating an institution towards the economy will only 
transform it into a cash cow. These arguments have been empirically confirmed by David 
Noble’s investigation of online universities, which has aptly described the fact that 
decisions are being made out of a concern for profit and not education. Dewey, to his 
credit, would probably cringe at the state of the universities today, but his philosophical 
heirs-Laidler and his friends, for example—are excited about this direction.
The second set of questions concern the validity of Freire’s method of pedagogy 
discussed in the last section: what makes this system any better than the liberal system o f  
education? The answer to this kind of question is quite simple; any system should be 
judged by its results. Liberal education is a successful theory of education, but only on its 
own terms: it is not truly liberating, as I have argued, but skilling. On the other hand, 
Freire’s philosophy was instrumental in educating a large group of illiterate peasants in a 
very short period of time and was, unlike the current form of liberal education, liberating. 
The peasants Freire worked with had grown up under the status quo system of education 
and had remained unable to read and write; they were able to learn, and liberate 
themselves from the ignorance imposed by their society, under the framework laid out by 
Freire. What is more, they desired to learn. To those who would decry these facts by 
claiming that the status quo method of education is different in Latin America than in 
North America, I want to reemphasize that Freire’s methodology has also been used in
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areas of America, with large populations of American students, with impressive results.2 
If this method of pedagogy was successful with individuals who had never expressed the 
desire to learn in the past, how successful do you think it will be with students who have 
already been engaged in the learning process?
Doubtless there are other questions, and in a critically free process of inquiry, 
such questions should exist and be open to dialogue. After all, questions will always be 
permitted in the educational setting I have described.
In conclusion it should be obvious that this thesis is not merely about education 
but about society as a whole. The university institution is a shadow, a reflection, of the 
social reality it occupies. But this thesis has suggested that the university can be much 
more than a simple shadow that mimics the social machine. More than the contradictory 
world shaped by the forces of capitalism, I propose that the university can and should be a 
force of social change.
One problem with this proposal is that this thesis is not exempt from the academic 
framework that it has criticized. It may seem like outright hypocrisy that I am attacking 
the very system of pedagogy within which I am engaged; this paper is written as a 
requirement for the liberal university—a disciplinary academic hoop that the graduate 
student hops through in order to fulfill tradition. It has been written in line with the 
academic method, and is somewhat inseparable from Freire’s teacher-student 
contradiction. It has still been written, however, within a space which still allows one to 
engage in a form of critical discourse. It is my sincere opinion that university education 
possesses the power to affect social change even though this power has long been eroded 
by the shadow of disciplinary tradition and economic integration.
2 Freire, p. 138, see previous chapter.
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In May 1968 in Paris, France the university students revolted and built barricades 
in the streets. Their rebellion affected a revolt within the Paris factories; the workers 
rebelled and joined the students in their barricades. The student revolutionaries of 1968 
“revealed the fragility of the social contracts installed successively to contain the 
revolutionary movements of the beginning of the century”.3 Ultimately this revolt was 
short-circuited and both the university and society returned to the way they were before 
the students rebelled. What counted, however, “amounted to a visionary phenomena, as 
if a society suddenly perceived what was intolerable in itself and also saw the possibility 
of change.”4 While May 1968 might have been a mere blip on the radar of revolution, it 
demonstrates that university students have the power to affect social change. Imagine 
what this power might be like if teachers join with students in a radical, uncontradictory 
university that attempts to change society instead of simply existing as its shadow.
3 Guattari and Negri, p. 20.
4 Deleuze and Guattari, “May 68 Did Not Take Place”, p. 209.
121
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
W orks Cited
Aristotle. “Selections from the Politics”. In A New Aristotle Reader, pp. 507-539. 
Edited by J.L. Ackrill. Translated by T.A. Sinclair and T.J. Saunders.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Aronowitz, Stanley. The Knowledge Factory: dismantling the corporate university 
and creating true higher learning. Boston: Beacon Press, 2000.
Bercuson, David, Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granastein. The Petrified Campus: the 
Crisis in Canada’s Universities. Toronto: Random House, 1997.
Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze and Guattari. New York: Routledge, 1989.
Boyd, Mary. “New Feudalism, New Serfs”. In Stone Soup: reflections on economic 
injustice, pp. 189-214. Edited by Betty Berigan and Richard Renshaw. 
Montreal: Paulines, 1998.
Cohn-Bendit, Daniel. Obsolete Communism: the Left-Wing Alternative. Translated 
by Arnold Pomerans. United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1969.
Debord, Guy. Comments on the Society of the Spectacle. Translated by Malcolm 
Imrie. London: Verso, 1990.
Debord, Guy. “Introduction to a Critique of Urban Geography”. In Situationist 
International: anthology, pp. 5-8. Translated and edited by Ken Rnabb. 
Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1995.
Debord, Guy. Society of the Spectacle. Detroit: Black & Red Press, 1983.
Debord, Guy. “Situationist Theses on Traffic”. In Situationist International: 
anthology, pp. 56-58. Translated and edited by Ken Knabb. Berkeley:
Bureau of Public Secrets, 1995.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia, vol. 
L Translated by Brian Masumi. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1998.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and
schizophrenia, vol. 2. Translated by Brian Masumi. Minnesota: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1998.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. “Capitalism: A Very Special Delirium”. In 
Hatred of Capitalism, pp. 215-220. Edited by Chris Kraus and Sylvere 
Lotringer. New York: Semiotext(e), 2001.
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. “May 68 Did Not Take Place”. In Hatred of
Capitalism, pp. 209-211. Edited by Chris Kraus and Sylvere Lotringer. New 
York: Semiotext(e), 2001.
Dewey, Jane, ed. “Biography of John Dewey”. In The Philosophy of John Dewey, 
pp. 1 -45. Edited by Paul Arthur Schlipp. New York: Tudor Publishing 
Company, 1951.
Dewey, John. Democracy & Education. New York: Free Press, 1966.
Dyer-Witheford, Nick. Cvber-Marx: cycles and circuits of struggle in high- 
technology Capitalism. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995.
Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. 
New York: Continuum, 1998.
Guattari, Felix. Soft Subversions. Translated by David L. Sweet and Chet Wiener. 
New York: Semiotext(e), 1996.
Guattari, Felix and Toni Negri. Communists Like Us. Translated by Michael Ryan. 
New York: Semiotext(e), 1990.
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: the Political 
Economy of theMass Media. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
Laidler, David, ed. Renovating the Ivory Tower. Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 
2002.
Lukacs, Georg. History and Class Consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics. 
Translated by Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.
Marx, Karl. The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Translated by 
Martin Milligan. New York: International Publishers, 2001.
McMurtry, John. “The Unspeakable: Understanding the System of Fallacy in the 
Media.” In Informal Logic, 10.3, pp. 133-150.
Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. In Classics of Western Philosophy [4th Ed.],
pp. 1171-1244. Edited by Steven Cahn. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company Inc., 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Noble, David. Digital Diploma Mills: the automation of higher education. Toronto: 
Between the Lines, 2002.
Plato. The Republic. Translated by Desmond Lee. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974.
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA AUCTORIS
Joshua Paul was bom in 1978 in London, Ontario. He graduated from Oakridge High 
School in 1997. From there he went on to the University of Western Ontario where 
he obtained a BA in Philosophy in 2001. He is currently a candidate for a Master’s 
degree in Philosophy at the University of Windsor. Joshua hopes to continue 
studying social philosophy clinging to the perhaps naive assumption that he can 
change the world.
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
